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Nodes taking part in mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) are expected to adhere to the
rules dictated by the routing protocol employed in the subnet. Secure routing protocols
attempt to reduce the ill-effect of nodes under the control of malicious entities who deliberately violate the protocol. Most secure routing protocols are reactive strategies which
include elements like redundancies and cryptographic authentication to detect inconsistencies in routing data advertised by nodes, and perhaps explicit measures to react to detected
inconsistencies.
The approach presented in this dissertation is a proactive approach motivated by the
question “what is a minimal trusted computing base for a MANET node?” Specifically, the
goal of the research was to identify a small set of well-defined low-complexity functions,
simple enough to be executed inside highly resource limited trusted boundaries, which can
ensure that nodes will not be able to violate the protocol.

In the proposed approach every node is assumed to possess a low complexity trusted
MANET module (TMM). Only the TMM in a node is trusted - all other hardware and
software are assumed to be untrusted or even hostile. TMMs offer a set of interfaces to
the untrusted node housing the TMM, using which the node can submit data to the TMM
for cryptographic verification and authentication. As other nodes will not accept packets
that are not authenticated by TMMs, the untrusted node is forced to submit any data that it
desires to advertise, to its TMM. TMMs will authenticate data only if the untrusted node
can convince the TMM of the validity of the data.
The operations performed by TMMs are to accept, verify, validate data submitted by
the untrusted node, and authenticate such data to TMMs housed in other nodes. We enumerate various TMM interfaces and provide a concrete description of the functionality
behind the interfaces for popular ad hoc routing protocols.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Wireless nodes forming mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) adhere to MANET routing
protocols to route packets amongst each other. Design of MANET protocols is substantially more challenging compared to routing protocols for wired networks due to a variety
of reasons like i) mobility of nodes leading to more frequent topological changes; ii) resource limitations inherent to mobile battery operated devices; and iii) several issues arising from using wireless instead of wired links between nodes. Perhaps one of the biggest
challenge in the design of MANET protocols stems from the fact that mobile devices (acting as routers and relaying packets on behalf of other nodes) may be under the control
untrusted or even malicious entities.

1.1

Secure MANET Protocols
Early MANET routing protocols simply assume that all nodes will follow the rules

dictated by the protocol. Rules governing secure MANET routing protocols include additional elements aimed at improving the resilience of MANET subnets to non cooperative
nodes. The additional elements in secure MANET protocols can be broadly classified into
four categories:
1. redundancy in routing information;
2. cryptographic authentication;
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3. monitoring neighbors for possible violations; and
4. using trustworthy component(s) in MANET nodes.

Several secure extensions of MANET routing protocols like dynamic source routing (DSR)
[1], ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) [2], and destination sequenced distance
vector (DSDV) protocol [4] have been proposed in the literature. However, most secure
MANET protocols address only a subset of the four elements. Such independent efforts
cannot be combined to build a comprehensive secure routing protocol due to the interdependencies between the different elements. For example,
1. the nature of cryptographic authentication can affect the ability to monitor;
2. the use of trustworthy components can reduce the redundancy required to provide
the same assurances; and
3. the redundancies employed can affect the choice of cryptographic authentication
schemes.

1.2

Goals and Hypothesis
Securing MANET routing protocols involves providing some tangible assurances that

nodes will abide by rules. Realizing assurances towards securing any system is achieved
by amplifying the trust in a trusted computing base (TCB) [7]. Most strategies to secure MANETs employ cryptographic authentication of routing data to limit an attackers
ability to disseminate inconsistent routing information. The TCB for facilitating cryptographic authentication includes a set of cryptographic algorithms (which are assumed to
be unbreakable), and a trusted authority (TA) who distributes cryptographic material to all
nodes of a MANET network. Secure MANET protocols that leverage this limited TCB i)
2

fail to provide some important assurances, and ii) typically impose substantial overhead
for resource limited battery operated mobile devices.
The primary goal of the research carried out for this dissertation is the identification of
a TCB for MANET nodes to improve the performance of MANETs by
1. providing assurances that reduce the scope of attacks while preserving the optimizations offered by the routing protocol, and
2. by reducing the overhead required for leveraging the TCB.

It is assumed that the TCB functions are executed inside trustworthy MANET modules
(TMM) housed in every MANET node; only the TMMs are trusted; the rest of the node all other hardware and software - are untrusted.
An important prerequisite for a trustworthy module to warrant trust is that the TCB
functions executed inside the module are simple, and consequently, easily verifiable. Simple TCB functions can also be implemented as hardwired logic (software-free), thus rendering moot a wide range of attacks that attempt to modify software. It is also desirable
that the modules consume as little power as possible, and consequently disseminate negligible heat, as such modules can be physically well shielded from deliberate and accidental
intrusions. With these self-imposed limitations on TCB functions aimed at improving the
reliability of TMMs while simultaneously lowering their cost, we seek a set of simple
MANET TCB functions.
The research hypothesis is that it is possible to design MANET TCB functions using only logical and cryptographic hash operations, and that the TCB functions can be
leveraged
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1. to ensure that nodes cannot advertise routing information that is inconsistent with
information assimilated from other nodes, and
2. to provide several useful assurances, including several assurances that are not provided by current secure MANET protocols.

1.3

Specific Contributions of this Dissertation

As several MANET routing strategies exist, the choice of the MANET routing protocol
for an ad hoc subnet scenario should consider several factors like subnet size, density,
mobility etc. For example, on-demand protocols like dynamic source routing (DSR), ad
hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) are widely regarded as well suited for scenarios
involving larger subnet sizes; the proactive dynamic sequence distance vector (DSDV)
protocol may be better suited for smaller subnet sizes. While most MANET protocols
assume that any pair of nodes in a subnet is equally likely to communicate, temporally
ordered routing algorithm (TORA) was designed explicitly for scenarios where most or all
nodes in the subnet communicate with one or a few “base-stations.”
While no one-size-fits-all MANET protocol exists, three protocols - DSR, AODV and
TORA - can together cater for the needs of most MANET subnets - especially since DSDV
can be seen as a special case of TORA. For this reason our research was restricted to
identifying a TCB for DSR, AODV and TORA.
The first contribution of this dissertation is a new protocol - collision resistant TORA designed to offset many of the limitations of TORA. Specifically, CR-TORA addresses two
fundamental limitations of TORA - TORA’s susceptibility to collisions, and that TORA is
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difficult to secure due to complex rules that govern the “height of a node.” The results of
this research has been published in a Journal article [8].
The second contribution is the specific functionality of TMMs necessary to secure
on-demand protocols like DSR and AODV to provide significantly enhanced assurances
compared to existing protocols. Specifically, current secure on-demand protocols which
simply strive to ensure the integrity of hop-count (in AODV) or path vector (in DSR) information by carrying over authentication, are susceptible to colluding nodes. Furthermore,
such protocols do not include explicit measures to i) inhibit supercilious route error packets; and ii) ensure that routing data will be accepted from (and relayed to) only nodes with
tested bidirectional links. The research results have been published in a recent conference
article [9].
The third contribution of this dissertation is a useful data structure, an index-ordered
merkle tree (IOMT) as an extension of the popular merkle hash tree. A merkle hash tree
permits a resource starved trusted entity “virtually store” a large database of records by
storing a single value - the root of the tree - inside the trusted boundary. The dynamic
records of the database are the leaves of a binary tree.
For true virtual storage of a large number of data records it is not sufficient for the
trusted entity to be capable of determining if a record (leaf) is indeed a part of the tree. An
important requirement is also the ability to determine that a record for some index is not
a part of the tree (does not exist in the database). An IOMT is an extension of the merkle
tree which is capable of verifying such negative queries efficiently.
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The fourth contribution of this dissertation is an extension of the TMM based approach
for securing AODV and DSR to realize some additional useful assurances (beyond the
assurances provided in [9]), by employing an IOMT for storing routing records. The novel
IOMT, and a strategy to leverage the IOMT to secure AODV was presented in a recent
conference [10]. In addition to the TCB functions required for maintaining a routing
record for each destination, for securing DSR it is necessary to maintain a database of paths
which can be used to propagate route requests. An expanded TCB capable of securing both
AODV and DSR has been submitted to a journal [11].
The fifth contribution of this dissertation is the identification of an efficient TCB for
securing CR-TORA. One of the main difference between securing AODV vs securing CRTORA stems from the fact that in the former (AODV) a node needs to maintain only one
routing record for every possible destination. However, in CR-TORA a node needs to
maintain a record corresponding to some or all neighbors for every destination. For this
purpose a separate IOMT is used to store the heights of every neighbor for each available
destination. These research results have been submitted to a journal [12].

1.4

Organization of this Report
The rest of this dissertation report is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we provide a

survey of relevant work in the literature.
Chapter 3 outlines the shortcomings of existing secure routing protocols, and the drawbacks of currently proposed trustworthy computing schemes to secure MANETs. Chapter 3 also provides an introduction to the proposed trusted MANET modules (TMMs) by
6

presenting their broad specifications, and some generic functionality that could be used by
all MANET routing protocols.
Chapter 4 presents a simple TCB to secure AODV and DSR. While trivial, this TCB
can nevertheless realize many of the assurances that are not possible using strategies that
rely on carrying over cryptographic authentication. While this is a substantial improvement over current solutions Chapter 4 also presents various limitations of this approach all of which result from the fact that the the TMM cannot “remember” routing data.
In Chapter 5 we present the most important of the contributions of this dissertation - an
efficient index ordered merkle tree (IOMT), which can enable a resource limited module
to virtually store large amounts of data by storing a single value inside the module.
Chapter 6 presents the design of the TMMs that employ IOMTs to store routing data.
It also includes various functions that can be used to securely realize AODV and DSR.
This chapter also includes an analysis of the security offered by the TMMs that employ
IOMTs.
Chapter 7 begins with a description of the shortcomings of TORA, and proposes a
new routing protocol CR-TORA which addresses the main limitations of TORA. We also
present simulation results that compare the performance of both TORA and CR-TORA.
Chapter 8 presents the TMM design to secure CR-TORA.
Conclusions are offered in Chapter 9. Chapter 9 also points out some possible future
extensions to this dissertation research, and the publications that resulted from this work.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE SURVEY

Resource limited nodes forming wireless mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) rely on
each other for routing packets amongst themselves, and thereby eliminate the need for an
infrastructure for this purpose. Due to their reduced dependence on infrastructure, they
have useful applications in scenarios where it is impractical to deploy such infrastructure.
Small scale applications include dynamic MANETs created for specific purposes like
search and rescue operations. Larger scale medium-area and wide-area networks can consist of many ad hoc subnets interconnected through mesh networks or the wired Internet.
Existing practical rural applications of MANETs include the popular one-laptop-per-child
(OLPC) project [13]; which utilizes multi-hop networks to provide interconnectivity between laptops in under-developed countries. In urban areas, due to the high cost of acquiring real estate for erecting communication infrastructure, it will be more economical for a
network operator to enlist the support of distributed wireless hot-spot operators, and home
users with Internet access, to provide wide-area voice and data services to mobile users.

2.1

Ad Hoc Routing Protocols

MANET routing protocols are rules imposed on nodes to route packets amongst themselves. The primary goal of all efficient routing protocols is to maximize information
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transmission while minimizing the usage of resources. Apart from many issues like correctness, stability, and fairness to be addressed by all routing protocols, MANET protocols
have to address some additional constraints like 1) the resource constrained nature of mobile devices, 2) rapid changes in topology due to mobility, and 3) issues specific to wireless
links.
MANET routing protocols can be classified into proactive and reactive protocols.
Proactive approaches like DSDV [4] and link state routing [5], [14] strive to maintain
a consistent view of the entire network at all times. In reactive protocols like dynamic
source routing (DSR) [1], and ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) [2] routes are
determined on-demand. Typically the discovery of routes starts with a Route Request
(RREQ) query which is flooded in a controlled fashion, and trigger a Route Response
(RREP) from nodes which have knowledge of a route to the destination. Combinations of
proactive and reactive approaches [6],[15] have also been proposed. Furthermore, some
protocols like Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA) [6] can operate in both
proactive and reactive modes.
In general, proactive routing protocols, where each node pro actively maintains forwarding paths to reach every node in the subnet, can demand substantial overhead if the
subnet size is large. On-demand protocols tend to be more efficient for large subnets. Many
practical applications of MANET will involve extending the reach of base stations by providing multi-hop connectivity to the base-stations. For scenarios where a large number
of nodes have to maintain connectivity to a small number of destinations (base-stations),
TORA [6] may be preferable.
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2.2

Secure Ad Hoc Routing Protocols
Apart from numerous considerations listed earlier which render design of MANET

routing protocols more challenging, another important consideration stems from the lack
of trust in routers. Unlike networks that have established infrastructure, where routers are
operated by large organizations, and thus implicitly trusted, some MANET nodes may be
under the control of malicious attackers. Secure MANET routing protocols also have to
cater for the possibility of malicious nodes in the subnet which may deliberately attempt
to sabotage the efficacy of the subnet routing mechanism.

2.2.1

Attacks

Attacks on ad hoc routing protocols that can be inflicted by non co-operating nodes can
be classified into passive, active and semi-active attacks.
In passive attacks, the attacker does not transmit any data. The aim of such attacks
could be to merely observe traffic patterns, or snoop on data exchanged between nodes.
Passive attacks can also result from selective participation of nodes. Some nodes may
participate in the routing process only if they have selfish reasons to do so, for example, if
they desire to be an end-point in an exchange.
Active attacks are performed by taking an active part in relaying messages and routing
information. Such attacks would attempt to modify relayed data with the intention of
disrupting routing protocols, or more generally, to prevent nodes from communicating
with each other. Some specific instances of active attacks include modification of hop
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counts in routing tables, reporting of fictitious neighbors, or randomly corrupting routing
information / data packets that are relayed.
Nodes performing semi-active attacks transmit and receive data, and do not change
data that is forwarded. One example of such an attack is for a node to just re-broadcast
packets that it receives without any modification, and thereby acting as an “invisible” relay. Such relays can cause many nodes which are not actually within the range of each
other to conclude that they are. After taking part in such an activity for some duration, the
semi-active attacker may then suddenly decide to remain silent. This can result in serious
disruptions of the routing tables in the vicinity, and consequently result in substantial bandwidth overhead. Two physically well separated invisible relays can also form worm-holes
[16]. By periodically turning on and off the worm-hole they can cause severe disruptions
in the perceived subnet topology.

2.2.2

Countermeasures

Secure routing protocols can be broadly classified into three categories. In the first
category are protocols which rely on cryptographic authentication techniques for verifying
the integrity of routing information. In the DSR-based secure routing protocol (SRP) [17]
only the source and destination share a secret; which is used to authenticate RREQ and
RREP packets. Any modification in these packets by a malicious intermediate node can
be identified at the end point, and hence will be discarded.
For a broadcast communication, appended authentication data needs to be validated by
multiple verifiers. Digital signatures can be used for this purpose, but their high resource
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requirements make their usage impractical. A broadcast authentication scheme TESLA
[32] can be used to address this issue. It makes use of symmetric cryptography, and yet
retains the required asymmetric property by clock synchronization, and delayed key disclosure. In TESLA each node picks an initial key KN , and computes a one-way chain of
secrets using KN −1 = H(KN ). Initially, a node releases K0 , and later periodically release
the remaining keys. In order to authenticate a message, a node selects a secret (say Ki ),
which is scheduled to be released only after the message is delivered to all the intended
receivers. On receiving the message a node verifies the freshness of Ki , and buffers it (the
received message) if key Ki is not yet disclosed. After receiving Ki , a node first verifies
Ki using Kj (a key which is previously released by the sender, and j < i) by checking
Kj = H i−j (Ki ), and later authenticates the previously buffered message with Ki .
Ariadne [18], a popular secure extension of DSR [1], employs TESLA for authentication of intermediate nodes in the path, and a per-hop hashing technique to prevent deletion
of nodes from the path. Ariadne assumes a pair of shared secrets between source and destination nodes, which are used for mutual authentication. Along with the RREQ packet,
source node appends a MAC (using the shared secret), which can be verified by the destination node. Every intermediate node appends a MAC while forwarding a RREQ packet,
and the appropriate TESLA key is released in the corresponding RREP packet. On receiving a RREQ, destination node verifies the source MAC, and also the hash-chain to detect
any deletion of intermediate nodes. On successful verification, a destination responds with
a RREP packet along with an appended MAC, which can be checked by the source node.
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After receiving a RREP packet, the source node authenticates the destination, and also
validates every intermediate node (using their appended TESLA keys).
SRP and Ariadne do not cater for the optimizations provided in DSR (for example,
using cached routes, route response by intermediate nodes, etc). In [39] Sivakumar et al.
provide a more comprehensive extension of Ariadne which supports some of the optimizations offered by DSR, due to the use of pairwise secrets instead of TESLA. Rather than
encrypting packets with a network wide group secret (to prevent covert attacks) one-hop
secrets (a key shared by each node with it’s neighbors) are used. In [53] digital signatures
are used to provide non repudiable proof of active attacks. Appended signatures are verified only by immediate neighbors. Each node strips the received signature and appends its
own, before forwarding the received RREQ packet.
Most of the proposed secure extensions of ad hoc routing protocols assume bi-directional
links. Unfortunately this is not a valid assumption. Sivakumar et al. [33] analyzes the effect of one-way links on DSR protocol. They explain how efficiency of the network is
effected by the presence of one-way links, and also propose secure strategies to deal with
one-way links.
In the secure AODV (SAODV) protocol [20] intermediate nodes are not required to
append any form of authentication. A per-hop hashing strategy is used to prevent attacks involving shortening of paths (reducing the hop count value), but does not prevent
the attacker from increasing the path length. Digital signatures are used to authenticate
non-mutable fields in the RREQ and RREP packets. SAODV proposes the concept of
dual-signatures, which can allow an intermediate node (that has a valid route to the speci13

fied destination) to respond to a received RREQ packet. In Du et al [21] secure extension
of AODV, one-hop and two-hop group secrets are employed for authentication of intermediate nodes; where the group secrets are conveyed individually using certificates based on
asymmetric schemes. Two hash values (H1 and H2 ) are appended to each routing packet,
where H1 (verified by the node’s one-hop neighbors) is used to authenticate the received
packet, and H2 (verified by the node’s two-hop neighbors) prevents the current node from
tampering routing data.
Wan et al [22] and Hu et al [23] have proposed secure extensions of DSDV where
each node shares a secret with every other node in the network, which is used for node
authentication. The former (S-DSDV) [22] classifies advertised routes into: authoritative
(routes that have either 0 or ∞ hop count) and non-authoritative Routes (routes with finite
hop count other than 0). S-DSDV performs node authentication for validating all the authoritative routes. For non-authoritative routes, along with node authentication, a receiver
cross-checks obtained information with the node mentioned in the next-hop field. The
latter approach (SEAD) [23] employs hash chains, where the depth of the pre-image is
controlled both by the distance of a node from the source and the current sequence number of the source. These hash chains are applied to authenticate the minimal hop counts
included in a routing update. Like SAODV, an attacker can not decrease the hop count
value, but can increase it.
While a majority of secure routing protocols focus on the need for cryptographic verification of the integrity of the established paths, the problem of identifying the perpetrators
responsible and strategies for “routing around” malicious nodes have received little atten14

tion. Awerbach et al [24] and Burmerster et al [31] propose tracing algorithms to detect
Byzantine faults. First approach [24] is applied on AODV, where each intermediate node
initializes a timer Ti during route creation (which is based on its distance from the destination). After forwarding a data packet, an intermediate node expects an acknowledgment
from the destination within Ti cycles. An intermediate node, whose Ti expires before
receiving the acknowledgment forwards an error report to the source, by which it (the
source) can locate the faulty link. The second mechanism [31] aims at identifying the malicious node, by repeatedly probing intermediate nodes to send an acknowledgment. This
issue is also investigated in [39], in the context of DSR.
In the second category are schemes which rely on assigning trust metrics to nodes
based on first-hand and second-hand observations. In [40] Bucheggar et al. proposed a
monitoring scheme where each node comprises of the following components: The monitor (which oversees the traffic generated by neighbors), Trust Manager (responsible of
generating alarms when malicious behavior is identified), The reputation system (where
the gathered information is analyzed to identify malign nodes), and the Path Manager (handling routes and traffic related to malicious nodes). Liu et al. [48] presents a reputation
mechanism which is used to rank nodes based on their observed behavior, and received
recommendations. Some researchers have proposed operation in the promiscuous mode
[40] - [42] as a strategy to identify misbehaving nodes. Pirzada et al [43] propose a mechanism for securing TORA, by employing trust metrics obtained through analysis of local
traffic.
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In the third category are schemes which rely on trusted computing modules to enforce
compliance to routing protocols [49] - [52]. Song et al [50] include the wireless transceiver
inside the trust boundary, by implementing it using tamper resistant hardware. In [49] by
Jarrett et al, the trusted computing module has complex features built into the wireless
driver (executed within the confines of the trusted module) to verify the integrity of wireless transceiver. In [52] Buttyan et al “nuglets of currency” are protected by smart-cards
to promote faithful forwarding of packets. The authors provide explicit consideration to
the need for lowering the complexity of tasks to be performed inside the trusted boundary.

2.3

AODV and DSR
AODV is an ad hoc on-demand routing protocol where the distance to a destination is

stored in a node’s routing table as a destination record (DR), indexed using the destination
identity. Other fields in the DR include a sequence number, hop-count, next-hop to reach
the destination, and validity time.
When a node desires to communicate with a destination, and finds that it does not have
a fresh route to the destination, a RREQ is flooded, indicating a fresh sequence number
of the initiator, the last known sequence number of the destination, and a hop-count field
which is initially set to zero. Every node that receives the RREQ
1. updates the sequence number of the source, and adds a DR (for the source) to a table
of DRs.
2. if the node does not have a path to the requested destination it forwards the RREQ
after incrementing the hop count field by one;
3. if the node has a fresh enough path to the destination (or if the node is the destination
itself), it responds by unicasting a RREP towards the source by sending the RREP
to the neighbor from which it received the RREQ.
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In the case of RREP by an intermediate node the hop count in RREP is set to the stored
value, and in the case of RREP by the destination, it is initialized to zero. Every node
receiving the RREP adds a DR for the destination, increments the hop count, and unicasts
the packet towards the source node.
Every entry in the routing table has a validity time after which it cannot be used. However, due to the mobility the information in the DRs can become invalid even before the
expiry period. AODV handles such premature expiry using route error (RERR) messages.
DSR also employs a similar RREQ, RREP and RERR packets. The difference is that
while in AODV intermediate nodes (that forward the RREQ) increment the hop-count, in
DSR every intermediate node inserts its identity. Thus, compared to AODV, DSR provides
some additional topology information. The primary disadvantage of DSR is the additional
bandwidth overhead for RREQ and RREP packets (which indicate the entire path instead
of a single field - hop count). The advantage accrued from the knowledge of the entire
path is that multiple paths between the source and destination can be established.

2.3.1

Secure Extensions of AODV

In the Secure AODV (SAODV) protocol [29] every node has a public-private key pair
with a certified public key. Digital signatures are used to authenticate immutable fields in
RREQ, RREP and RERR messages, which are specified by the source of the packet (an
end-point). The immutable field includes a commitment to a hash chain of length x0 · · · xn ,
(where xi = h(xi−1 ), and h() is a cryptographic hash function like SHA-1) where n is the
maximum length of the path. The RREQ from the source (indicating hop-count 0) is
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accompanied by a value x0 . Nodes at the first hop are required to increment the hop-count
by 1, and propagate the RREQ along with the value x1 = h(x0 ), and so on.
In order to secure route responses by intermediate nodes SAODV employs double signature extensions for RREQ and RREP packets. The RREPs generated by an intermediate
node includes the signature of the destination to validate the immutable fields, and also a
signature of the intermediate node to authenticate the new validity time.
In the SAODV-2 protocol [38] only symmetric cryptography is used. SAODV-2 argues that schemes for establishment of pairwise secrets between two nodes demand substantially lower computational and bandwidth overhead. Further, SAODV-2 uses two hop
authentication to thwart illegal hop changes. In two-hop authentication a node (say A)
appends a MAC which is verifiable by its two-hop neighbors (say C). When C receives
this packet via B (neighbor of A) it can compare the hop count announced by B to the one
included by A, and thereby identify illegal modifications.
Asad Amir Pirzada and Chris McDonald proposed a secure variant of AODV [61]
where authorized neighboring nodes share a common secret, which is used to encrypt
all the forwarded control packets. They use asymmetric cryptography to arrive at shared
secrets. Their scheme does not address the issue of an authorized node behaving maliciously. Leiyuan Li and Chunxiao Chigan proposed Token Routing Protocol(TPR) [62]
with a motivation of reducing the computation costs involved in SAODV (as the later uses
asymmetric cryptography). Unlike SAODV they suggest the usage of pairwise secrets
between ad hoc nodes. TPR uses two hash chains, one to protect hop count (which is
identical to the one used in SAODV) and another to provide node authentication. Node
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authentication is provided using tokens, which in turn are hash chains computed using the
shared secret between source and destination.

2.3.1.1

Secure Extensions of DSR

A well known secure extension of DSR is Ariadne [18] which uses the TESLA broadcast authentication protocol [32] for authenticating network packets. Every intermediate
node forwarding an RREQ appends a TESLA MAC which can be verified at the end of the
reverse path. As the authentication appended by every node will be verified by the RREQ
source, nodes cannot be inserted into the path. To prevent nodes from deleting other nodes
in the path a per-hop hashing strategy is used which leverages a shared secret between
end-points (the RREQ source and the destination).
In [39] an improved Ariadne (iAriadne) was proposed which mandates every node to
maintain a “private logical neighborhood” (PLN) and introduces an additional value to be
inserted by every node forwarding the RREQ - an “encrypted up-stream per-hop hash.”
Unlike Ariadne with TESLA, iAriadne relies on pairwise secrets between nodes.

2.4

TORA

TORA is a hybrid ad hoc routing protocol which can operate in both reactive and proactive modes to determine multiple paths to some destinations. Unlike AODV and DSR,
where the route discovery process is to enable a specific node to find a path / forwarding
information to a specific destination, in TORA, all nodes in the subnet learn forwarding
information to the destination. Additionally, unlike proactive protocols like DSDV where
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forwarding information is sought for all nodes in the subnet, in TORA forwarding information is sought only for a few specific destinations. TORA can also operate in proactive
mode, where destinations periodically advertise their presence.
In TORA [6] the route to a destination from any node is based on the “height” of a node
with respect to the destination. Every node maintains a set of parameters which specifies
its height (for a specific destination). The set of parameters which reflect the height of
a node is a 5 tuple (τ, oid, r, δ, id). The first three values (τ, oid, r) form the “reference
level” where:
1. τ is the logical time of creation of the reference level (which is usually a result of
the failure of a link);
2. oid is the identity of the node that created the reference level; and
3. r is a reflection bit (more on this later);
The value δ is incremented at every hop from the node which created the reference level.
The field id is the identity of the node. Together, the five fields reflect the “height” of a
node from the destination.
In a subnet with d destinations the TORA protocol can be seen as d independent instances of the protocol - one for each destination. For each destination every node stores
heights of each of its neighbors. Based on the heights of its neighbors, a node determines
its own height. If a node A has greater height than a neighbor B, then A is regarded as
the upstream neighbor of B (and B is the downstream neighbor of A). Data can flow only
downwards; i.e from upstream to downstream.
If the height of a node A for a destination is NULL (or height (−, −, −, −, A)), this
implies that no forwarding path is available for A. If the height is any value other than
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NULL, the node can forward a packet to the destination by sending it to any downstream
neighbor. The height of the destination (for itself) is ZERO (or (0, 0, 0, 0, id), where id is
the destination identity).
From a broad perspective the goal of TORA is to ensure that as long as a physical path
exists from a node to a destination, the height of the node (for that destination) should be
non NULL, and moving downstream at every hop should ultimately lead to the destination
(though not necessarily over a minimal number of hops).

2.4.1

Route Discovery, Maintenance and Erasure

TORA consists of three phases in its routing:
1) Route Discovery (Query, Update and OPT): A node which has a NULL height to
a destination can broadcast a query (QRY) packet for the destination. Each node receiving
the QRY packet checks whether it has a non NULL height for the destination. If the node
also has a NULL height it rebroadcasts (forwards) the QRY packet. In a scenario where
the QRY packet reaches the destination, it broadcasts its ZERO height in an update packet
(UPD). On receiving an UPD packet from its neighbor, every node updates the neighbor’s
height. A node sets its own height to the received value, and increments the δ value by
1, and broadcasts its own height. For instance, node A receiving (0, 0, 0, 2, B) from a
neighbor B, stores the received tuple as B’s height; sets its own height to (0, 0, 0, 3, A)
and forwards it in an UPD packet. Now A is the upstream neighbor of B (for the specific
destination).
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In proactive mode where destinations pro actively advertise their presence, every destination periodically broadcasts its existence in an special update packet termed as OPT
(which includes the height of the destination D- (0, 0, 0, 0, D)). Each OPT packet from
the destination indicates a sequence number (referred to as mode sequence number). Thus,
in TORA the heights of nodes are established during QRY-UPD process, and in proactive
versions of TORA, periodically refreshed through OPT packets originating from destinations. Changes in topology that occur between two OPT packets (with different mode
sequence numbers) are handled by the route maintenance process.
2) Route Maintenance : Route maintenance is triggered only when a node no longer
has a path to the destination (has no downstream neighbors). To understand the rules
governing TORA’s route maintenance, consider a node i, and let Ni be the set of neighbors
of the node i.
Generating a new reference level: Let us assume that the current height of node i is
(τ0 , oid, r, δi , i). If node i looses a downstream link with a node j ∈ Ni , and if j is not
the last downstream node, i does nothing - except remove the height entry for the node
j. On the other hand, if i looses its last downstream link, i creates a new reference level
(τ, i, 0) where τ > τ0 (where τ0 is the first field in the current reference level). Node
i sets its height to (τ, i, 0, 0, i). The second field i indicates that node i generated this
new reference level. By generating a new reference level, node i reverses its links to its
upstream neighbors. In other words, i requests the nodes which were previously upstream
of i to become i’s downstream nodes.
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Propagating a new reference level: If node i loses its last downstream link due to a
link reversal (by its previously downstream node), node i determines the neighbor with the
highest reference level. A reference level (τ1 , oid1 , r1 ) > (τ2 , oid2 , r2 ) if τ1 > τ2 . If τ1 =
τ2 , then oid1 > oid2 . If both these fields are equal then the level with a larger r is higher.
If multiple neighbors have the same highest reference level, say (τj , oidj , rj ), i chooses
the one with the least δ value. Let the height of that neighbor j ∈ Ni be (τj , oidj , rj , δj , j).
Now i sets its height to (τj , oidj , rj , δj − 1, i), and sends its height in a UPD packet. By
setting its δ lower than j, i becomes a downstream node of j.
Reflecting a reference level: If node i loses its last downstream link due to a link
reversal, and all it’s neighbors have the same reference level (τj , oidj , rj ), and if rj = 0,
node i reflects the reference level by setting rj = 1 in its height. In this case the height of i
becomes (τj , oidj , 1, 0, i). Note that (τj , oidj , 1) > (τj , oidj , 0). This height is announced
to its neighbors in an UPD packet.
Detecting a partition: Now let us consider the scenario where node i looses its last
downstream link due to link reversal, and all its neighbors have the same reference level
(τj , oidj , 1) with the reflector bit set.
If i did not originate the reference level (or i 6= oidj ) then i generates a new reference
level and sets its height to (τ 0 , i, 0, 0, i) where τ 0 > τj . On the other hand, if the reference
level oidj was created by i (or i = oidj ), then i detects a partition in the network rendering
the destination unreachable. In this case i sets its height to NULL - or (−, −, −, −, i). In
the former case the height of i is announced in an UPD packet. In the later case the height
is announced in a clear (CLR) packet.
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The basic algorithm of TORA’s route maintenance phase is detailed in Figure 2.1.

IF (link-failure)
GENERATE-RL
ELSE //(link reversal)
IF (all-neighbors-not-at-same-RL)
PROPAGATE-RL
ELSE
IF (r == 0)
REFLECT-RL
ELSE
IF (RL-created-by-me)
CLEAR-RL
ELSE
GENERATE-RL

Figure 2.1
Route Maintenance of TORA

Route erasure: The CLR packet contains the destination and the reference level of the
node in addition to the five-tuple height. Every node that receives the CLR packet and has
a matching reference level erases its height (sets it to NULL) for the destination indicated,
and re-broadcasts the CLR packet.

2.4.2

IMEP

Internet MANET Encapsulation Protocol (IMEP) [70] was primarily meant for aggregation of upper layer protocol (routing protocols) packets to encapsulate smaller control
packets into fewer IMEP packets, and thereby reduce channel access delays. IMEP also
provides other useful services like broadcast reliability, link status sensing, and authentication. Connection status of neighboring nodes is determined by exchanging BEACON and
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ECHO packets. When reliable delivery is requested, IMEP mandates acknowledgments
to verify accurate reception of packets. IMEP uses a selective repeat algorithm to deliver
lost packets. It employs digital signatures to provide authentication, and also describes a
message format for exchanging certificates. TORA was intended to be layered over IMEP.

2.4.3

Secure Extensions of TORA

While multiple secure protocols have been proposed for cryptographic authentication
of routing fields for other ad hoc routing protocols like AODV, DSR and DSDV, none have
been proposed for TORA.
Vee Liem Chee et al. [60] analyzed security flaws in TORA, and identified three attacks
- route disruption, route invasion and resource consumption, that a malicious participant
can launch. These attacks are carried out by faulty processing of control messages in the
network. Asad Amir et. al [43] propose a mechanism to secure TORA based on trust
development. They ignore the need for cryptographic authentication to monitor neighbors. In their scheme, a node passively monitors the packets and data it receives from its
neighbors. It then assigns trust values (-1 to 1) to the collected information, which is later
classified into various groups. Finally weights are assigned to each identified group, and
a weighted total of trust for a particular node is computed. They propose an extension to
their trust model in [35] where nodes can exchange the calculated trust metrics.
The key security requirement in any network is authentication; a receiver should be
able to verify the identity of the sender. Without authentication any node can send incorrect
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packets with spoofed identity, which will result in assigning low trust values to the node
whose identity is spoofed.
While IMEP, which is the underlying layer for TORA, can provide cryptographic authentication of transmissions by neighbors, this feature is optional. Furthermore, that a
node A receives a cryptographically authenticated height value from a neighbor B only
implies that the source of the broadcast is B - not that the height provided by B is correct.
Verifying integrity of routing messages also mandates some redundancies. Such requirements are also ignored in [35].

2.5

Trustworthy Computing

2.5.1

Trusted Computing Base

The trusted computing base (TCB) of a system is “a small amount of software and hardware we rely on, and that we distinguish from a much larger amount that can misbehave
without affecting security” [7].
As an example, consider a generic communication system where an important assurance sought is the ability to verify that a message sent from one entity to an another cannot
be modified in transit by intermediaries. To realize such an assurance we typically rely on
a TCB which includes a certificate authority (CA), who (we assume) does due diligence
before signing public key certificates, and ensures that it’s private key is well protected. We
also rely on the assumption that cryptographic algorithms like RSA, DSA, AES, SHA-1
etc., are unbreakable. When one receives a message authenticated using the secrets be-
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longing to an entity A, it is assumed that the message is from A, as it is implicitly assumed
that the secrets of A are privy only to A.
As a more concrete example, the widely used web-security protocol, SSL, leverages
such a TCB to provide an assurance that data sent by clients will be privy only to SSL
servers. However, when a client sends some sensitive information (like a credit-card number) to a server over an SSL connection, it only ensures that the information remains
private till it reaches the server. There is no assurance that such information cannot be
abused after it reaches the server, say by entities who have unfettered access to the server.
Thus, in many practical scenarios, the limited TCB which caters only for cryptographic
authentication, is not sufficient as a basis for realizing important assurances.

2.5.2

Trustworthy Computing Modules

The most common approach to expand the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) is by employing trustworthy computing modules which provide some “specialized” TCB functions, performed inside trustworthy boundaries.
In the trustworthy computing group (TCG) model [25] for realizing trusted platforms
a trustworthy platform module (TPM) performs several specialized fixed functions to provide i) the ability for remote parties to verify that the platform equipped with the TPM is in
an “acceptable state” - that only authorized software has been loaded and executed by the
CPU (even though the TPM does not have direct control over the CPU); and ii) the ability
to provide secrets to the TPM, bound to some platform states, which will be released by
the TPM only when the platform is in that specific state.
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Unlike TPMs, the IBM 4758 [26] trustworthy computing module (TCM) sports a general purpose processor inside a protected boundary, running a specialized operating system, and can execute application code unmolested inside the trusted boundary. The rich
set of programmable functions that can be executed inside the boundary can provide a rich
TCB that can be leveraged to realize assurances that may not be possible otherwise.
Unlike inexpensive TPM chips (a few dollars) with fixed functionality, the programmable
TCB offered by IBM module comes at a substantially higher cost (a few thousand dollars).
It is for this reason, that in this paper we seek a set of fixed functionality suitable for securing MANETs. We deliberately impose some restrictions on such fixed functionality
to ensure that TMMs which offer such functionality can be easily verified, will consume
negligible power, and thus can be simultaneously trustworthy and inexpensive to realize.
TMMs that offer the TCB for securing MANETs will demand substantially lower complexity compared to even inexpensive TPM chips. Unlike TPMs which offer a set of about
120 fixed functions, TMMs will offer substantially fewer number of such functions. Furthermore, unlike TPM chips, TMMs will not require to perform asymmetric cryptographic
computations. TMMs will merely perform fixed sequences of logical and cryptographic
hash operations.

2.5.3

Existing Trustworthy Computing Schemes for MANETs

Many schemes have been proposed in the literature that propose the usage of trustworthy computing to protect ad hoc networks. Trusted modules can be used to verify the state
of the currently loaded routing protocol, and can also attest this information to a remote
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verifier. In [55] Mingsheng et al have proposed to use this remote attestation feature of
a trusted module to secure ad hoc networks. The initial state of the routing protocol is
calculated, and is stored securely in a platform configuration register (PCR). When ever
the operating system loads the routing protocol, the TPM compares its state with the value
stored in its PCR. A TPM can also attest this information to a remote verifier using public
key cryptography.
Remote attestation can expose the identity of a user, and hence has some privacy concerns. The approach proposed in [56] employs direct anonymous attestation (DAA), a
cryptographic protocol that provides remote attestation while preserving user identity.
The scheme presented in [57] proposes a Tamper Resistant Module (TRM), which can
be used to protect both the routing module and the MAC layer of the ad hoc node. They
also assume a secure channel between the routing module and MAC layer, that can be used
to exchange data securely.
Michael et al in [58] employs trustworthy computing to address issues related to both
selfish nodes, and secure routing. They assume that the routing agent, which includes all
the software and operating system components that are responsible for managing routing,
and wireless driver are executed within trusted boundaries. The routing agent is responsible for implementing all the routing rules, and securely communicates with the wireless
driver to obtain reports about the packets forwarded by the node. The routing agent refuses to take part in future routing when the metrics obtained in the reports drop below a
predefined threshold value.
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2.5.3.1

Dual Agent Approach

In [54] Gaines et al argued the need for a dual agent approach to secure ad hoc routing
protocols. In this approach any MANET device is seen as consisting of two independent
agents: 1) an untrusted, selfish user agent satisfying the needs of the owner of the device,
and 2) a trusted, selfless network agent working towards the overall good of the network.
The network agent (for example, a tamper-sensitive chip in the mobile device) is entrusted
with the responsibility of ensuring that the mobile device does not violate the protocol.
In the dual agent model with a trusted network agent (NA) and an un-trusted user
agent (UA), the Network Agent is a tamper-proof secure co-processor, which is physically
in the possession of the User Agent. Every packet sent or action taken by the User Agent
is verified and signed by the Network Agent. Packets not authenticated by a network
agent are dropped at the receiving end. Unlike other secure protocols which attempt to
overcome the effects of malicious nodes, the intention in dual agent approach is to prevent
nodes from misbehaving. However, elements from other secure routing protocols can still
be used to cater for the failure of network agents.
While many researchers have proposed similar models, they did not take into consideration some of the constraints that need to be imposed on the network agents. Jarrett and Ward proposed Trusted Computing Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector protocol (TCAODV) [49], which is a secure variant of AODV that employs a trusted module.
Asymmetric cryptography is used to provide authentication between nodes (trusted modules), and each control packet is signed by the sender’s trusted module (routing agent). In
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their approach a node’s routing agent is aware of the protocol functionalities, and ensures
a node’s adherence to the employed routing protocol.
The dual agent approach by Gaines et al was motivated by the following reasons:
1. It is not possible for the network interface to be under the control of the trusted
agent. The user agent can simply drop signed packets.
2. It is impractical for the network agent to perform all tasks - network agents have to
rely on the user agent to observe neighbors.
3. It is essential to reduce the complexity of the network agent to the extent feasible in
order to improve its reliability.
Motivated by the need to reduce complexity of network agents Gaines et al divided the
tasks to be performed by a MANET node into two categories: selfish tasks and selfless
tasks [54]. Sending its own data, generating routing traffic in search of a route, can be
considered as selfish tasks. Routing network traffic, relaying information generated by
other nodes, constitute selfless tasks. Security mechanisms employed should acknowledge
this difference, and provide means to secure each type of task separately. Such a distinction
is lacking in existing approaches to secure routing protocols. The role of the network agent
should be limited to securing self-less tasks.
Gaines et al [54] apply dual agent approach to secure DSDV [4]. More specifically, the
intent of [54] was investigation of efficient strategies to protect the integrity of the distance
vector routing tables stored by the user agent. A combination of NSEC [64] (a mechanism
used for authenticated denial of existence of DNS resource records) and Bloom filters
[65] are used for this purpose. More specifically, NSEC employs a hash which links one
element to the next element in an ordered list. Thus the ability to prove that (for example)
10 follows 5, is a proof that 6, 7, 8, and 9 do not exist. A HMAC (computed using a key
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stored with the network agent) is appended to each NSEC record by the network agent.
This would make it tamper-proof from the user agent.
Routing information rendered stale prematurely, due to the availability of new information, are stored in a Bloom filter (which are stored in network agent) to ensure that the
user agent cannot replay such stale data. Their simulations show that for a network of 400
nodes, about 2.5kb of storage is required by each network agent (to hold information that
is required to counter the attacks mentioned); and the efficiency of the network is about
90% (at any time instant in the network, on an average 90% of the routes that physically
exist are reflected consistently in the routing tables of all nodes).
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CHAPTER 3
SECURING MANET ROUTING USING TRUSTWORTHY MANET MODULES

As seen in the previous chapter, several secure extensions of various MANET routing protocols have been proposed in the literature. From a broad perspective the main
shortcomings of current secure routing protocols are
1. High overhead for the additional security measures; and
2. inability to provide several important assurances.

3.1

Shortcomings of Current Secure Protocols
Even while demanding substantial overhead, SAODV still leaves an AODV MANET

susceptible to a wide range of attacks. Some of the main shortcomings of SAODV (which
are addressed in SAODV-2) are
1. lack of mechanisms to authenticate intermediate nodes (intermediate nodes are not
required to append any authentication)
2. inability to prevent some misrepresentations of the hop-count: it can only ensure
that a node receiving an RREQ/RREP with hop count r cannot relay a hop count
less than r. A malicious node can incorrectly (or maliciously) relay the same hop
count r or a hop count greater than r, and
3. lack of mechanisms to address one-way links.

While SAODV-2 addresses many of the pitfalls of SAODV, SAODV-2 is still susceptible
to many attacks. SAODV-2 assumes that nodes will not collude together. Colluding nodes
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can easily thwart two hop authentication. Secondly, there is no mechanism for regulating
creation of RERR packets.
Unlike SAODV (where intermediate nodes are not required to append authentication),
in Ariadne authentication of intermediate nodes is mandatory. Unfortunately, in most
secure extensions of DSR the verification of the authentication occurs very late in the
RREQ-RREP process. For this reason, malicious nodes in the path can simply send random RREQ packets which even though will not be accepted by end-points, can preempt
propagation of genuine RREQs.
The main pitfalls of Ariadne that are addressed by iAriadne are addition of mechanisms
for i) link-layer (one-hop) authentication, and ii) preventing abuse of one-way links - both
of which are achieved by imposing a private logical neighborhood (PLN). iAriadne also
introduces an additional upstream per-hop hash to be introduced by every node relaying the
RREQ to facilitate the RREQ destination to narrow down intermediate nodes that engage
in active attacks.

3.1.1

Collusion

However, the security of all four protocols (SAODV, SAODV-2, Ariadne and iAriadne)
are based on the assumption that nodes will not collude. In both SAODV and SAODV-2
colluding nodes can ensue that even shorter hop counts can be relayed. In Ariadne and
iAriadne colluding nodes can trivially delete nodes from the path.
The primary reason that facilitates easy collusion is that two nodes A and B simply
need to share their secrets to do so. Through their ability to send packets impersonating A
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or B, both A and B can create packets with misleading information - with the misleading
information provided by A consistent with the misleading information provided by B.
Obviously, three such nodes A, B, C sharing their secrets can engineer an even broader
variety of attacks.

3.1.2

Carrying Over Authentication

Security mechanisms that employ carry over authentication would increase the packet
size, as each packet needs to hold authentication information about multiple nodes. Now
Consider an example where a packet was relayed by node A, and later was forwarded by B
to node C. In schemes based on two hop authentication, apart from validating the received
information, node C should also verify that A is a neighbor of B, and that B indeed is
relaying the information it directly received from A. This requires C to accurately obtain
the neighborhood information of node B, which would incur a lot of overhead.

3.1.3

Unregulated RERR Creation

Another pitfall of all secure on-demand protocols is the lack of mechanisms to regulate
the creation of route-error (RERR) packets. An effective strategy for an attacker to introduce unnecessary additional overhead is to participate faithfully in establishing a path and
then send a supercilious RERR packet - mandating a fresh route creation process.
For example, an attacker C in a path A → B → C → X can simply send a RERR
claiming to have lost the link to X (even while the link exists). The risk the attacker C
faces in doing so is that if X hears the RERR packet, X may disregard future packets from
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C (which might affect C’s ability to connect to some nodes). A selfish node desiring to
retain X as a neighbor can however still manage to send such a RERR packet by ensuring
that the RERR will not be heard by X. This can be achieved easily by exploiting the
medium access control protocol. For example, if a collision avoidance protocol is used,
C can send the packet as soon as X sends a clear to send (CTS) or a request to send
(RTS) packet, thereby ensuring that C’s RERR suffers collision at X (but will be received
collision-free by other neighbors of C).

3.1.4

Limited Optimizations

Original versions of AODV and DSR include several optimizations to improve their
efficacy. Such optimizations include route responses by intermediate nodes, local path
repairs, using cached information for relaying messages etc. Most secure extensions of
protocols do not support such optimizations as they introduce new avenues of attacks.
Thus, the overhead for using secure routing protocols have two sources - direct overhead
for cryptographic authentication, and indirect overhead resulting from the fact that several
useful optimizations cannot be used.

3.2

Shortcomings of Current Schemes Based on Trustworthy Computing
The above mentioned limitations of currently proposed secure extensions can be ad-

dressed by using a trusted module (like TPMs) that governs the routing actions taken by
a node. A trusted module is assumed to be tamper resistant, and can securely execute the
operations encoded into it.
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The idea of using trusted modules to secure ad hoc routing protocols is widely being
investigated. However, most of the current work make unrealistic assumptions about the
trusted module, and also does not provide a clear explanation on how they can used to
realize existing MANET routing protocol.

3.2.1

Questionable Trusted Boundaries

The components included within the boundaries of a trusted module are assumed to be
tamper proof. Hence it is required to deliberately limit elements enclosed within trusted
boundaries. However, the proposed schemes violate this requirement by assuming the
trusted modules to include several system level components. The mechanisms proposed in
[55, 56] include BIOS, boot loader procedures, and operating system kernel inside trusted
boundaries. In [57, 58] the MAC layer of a MANET node is also enclosed by a trusted
module. Such unrealistic assumptions are hard to realize, and drastically increase the
trusted boundary space.

3.2.2

Computational Overhead

Trusted modules are assumed to be physically well shielded in order to prevent unauthorized modifications to encoded logic, and also to protect internally stored secrets. Therefore a trusted module is required to be severely resource limited, to offer itself for proper
shielding. Contrarily, the proposed trusted computing schemes assume the trusted module
to execute complex algorithms like public key cryptography. Further they also assume to
store hugely accumulated routing data (like routing tables) within trusted boundaries.
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3.2.3

Lack of Proper Interface Definitions

None of the currently existing schemes present a clearly defined interfaces which can
be used to realize an existing MANET routing protocol. Instead, they either conveniently
assume that the entire routing logic is implemented within trusted boundaries, or that a
trusted module verifies the correctness of the routing protocol, when it is loaded by the
operating system.

3.3

Trustworthy MANET Modules

In our research we designed a trustworthy MANET module (TMM) which can be used
to secure MANET routing protocols. These TMMs are designed to address the shortcomings of existing secure extensions. Additionally, we clearly define the functionalities of a
TMM, by providing a detailed description of the interfaces exposed by them (TMMs). The
routing logic of a MANET routing protocol is distributed among these interfaces, and a
node can invoke them in a particular order to realize the routing protocol supported by the
TMM. Finally, we deliberately limit the computational and storage capabilities of these
TMMs.

3.4

Specifications of TMMs
In the generic approach outlined in the rest of this dissertation it is assumed that a

TMM is housed in every mobile node. In the interest of rendering the module trustworthy, TMMs are constrained to possess low complexity. By performing simple operations
TMMs attempt to ensure that mobile nodes will not be able to violate the routing protocol.
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It is assumed that every TMM has a unique identity (which is the same as the identity
assigned to the node). Several light-weight key distribution schemes exist to permit any
two TMMs to establish a shared secret. In the rest of this dissertation it is assumed that the
modified Leighton-Micali scheme is used for this purpose, where computing any pairwise
secret will require nodes to perform a single hash operation.
TMMs recognize a simple data structure for destination records (DR). TMMs receive
authenticated records from TMMs of other nodes, modify some fields in the destination
records subject to some simple rules (for example, incrementing a hop-count field), and
authenticate records to other nodes. Message authentication codes (MAC) based on pairwise secrets are used for authentication of records.
TMMs also maintain a table of neighboring nodes. A node A is recognized as a neighbor by a node B only if an authenticated packet from A is received. Every packet is
acknowledged. Only if an authenticated acknowledgment is received from A (for a packet
sent by B) does B consider A as a neighbor with bidirectional link. TMMs honor destination records only from neighbors with bidirectional links, and send authenticated routing
records only to neighbors with bidirectional links.
By maintaining a table of neighbors, and by performing simple and fixed sequences of
logical and hash function operations, TMMs ensure adherence to the rules that govern a
MANET protocol. More specifically, the assurances realized using the proposed approach
is only based on the assumptions that
1. the secret stored inside the TMM cannot be exposed, and
2. the simple and fixed functionality of the TMM cannot be modified.
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More specifically, the nodes themselves, and the users in control of the nodes are not
trusted. In the rest of this dissertation we describe the precise functionality of TMMs
required for securing various MANET routing protocols.

3.4.1

High Level Architecture of TMMs

It is assumed that every TMM possesses
1. an in-built cryptographic compression function h() (for example, SHA-1);
2. protected non-volatile memory for storing one or a few symmetric secrets, and one
or a few non-secret values which have to be remembered across reboots of the TMM;
3. limited volatile RAM for storing some dynamic values like a table of neighbors,
some protocol parameters etc.;
4. I/O registers;
5. a clock-tick counter; and
6. control logic which drives the functionality of the TMM.

A TMM assigned identity X is assumed to possess a secret KX , provided to the TMM
by a trusted key distribution center. This secret is used for computing pairwise secrets for example, a pairwise secret KXY privy only to TMMs X and Y . The TMM X also
possesses a secret SX known only to itself (generated by TMM X).
It is assumed that the clock of the TMM runs even when the TMM is powered off.
An offset ox , provided to the TMM by a trusted authority, is subtracted by the TMM
to compute the current time t. We represent the current time as seen by X as tx . It is
assumed that all TMMs agree on the current time “reasonably well” (for example, within
a few tenths of a second).
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TMM functionality necessary for time synchronization and boot-strapping of TMMs
are not a concern of this dissertation. The main focus is identifying simple TMM functionality to ensure adherence of nodes to the MANET routing protocol.

3.4.2

Pairwise Secrets Between TMMs

Several key distribution schemes for facilitating pairwise secrets between trustworthy
modules have been proposed in the recent past. For scenarios involving trustworthy modules there are compelling reasons to reduce the computational overhead inside the module
for the operations performed using protected secrets. For the scheme in [27] each module
will be required to store a few tens of keys and perform a few tens of block cipher operations for computing any pairwise secret. For the scheme in [28] each module will need to
store a single secret and perform a single block-cipher operation.
While both schemes support asynchronous induction of nodes, the former [27] can
support unlimited network sizes; the latter [28] imposes a soft limit on the maximum
number of nodes (for example, not much more than a few tens of millions). In this paper
we assume that the scheme in [28] is used for facilitating pairwise secrets. Specifically the
pairwise secret KAB between A and B is computed by A as
KAB = h(KA k B) ⊕ PAB .

(3.1)

where PAB is a pairwise public value. The TMMs do not have to worry about the integrity
of the public values. The public values are maintained by nodes. Modifications to the
public values cannot result in exposure of the secrets.
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3.4.3

Neighbor Table

The neighbor table of a TMM X consists of one or more neighbor records of the form
N = [idn k Kpw k t0 k l]

(3.2)

where idn is the identity of a neighbor, Kpw is a pairwise secret, t0 is the freshest authenticated time-stamp from idn , and l ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} is the status of the link to neighbor id.
Status 0 is unverified link. Status 1 indicates verified link, which has not been tested for
bi-directionality. Status 2 reflects a verified bidirectional link. Neighbors with status 3 are
those that are revoked by the node. These neighbors can not be used for routing until the
period t0 expires.
The neighbor table N is a set of neighbor records. As an example, the contents of the
neighbor table of a TMM X can be as follows:
A KXA t0a 2
B KXB t0b 3
t0c

1

E KXE 0

0

C KXC

(3.3)

indicating a neighbor A with tested bidirectional link, one neighbor C with untested bidirectional link, and an unverified entry for a node E. Further X explicitly revoked neighbor
B, and hence can not send packets to it until time t0b . At a time tx according to TMM
X, an entry with time-stamp t0 < tx − δn (where δn is a constant) is also considered as
an unverified entry. For such an entry in N the time stamp and link status are set to 0.
Basically it means that neighbors unheard for δn time are marked as unverified.
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3.4.4

Authentication Record and Message Authentication Codes

TMMs recognize the structure of authentication records of the form
A = [idp k hr k t k ACK k µ],

(3.4)

where t is a time-stamp and hr is a value provided by a node idp (in future references
we term it as the provider). The value ACK is a flag which is set to one to indicate an
acknowledgment. The value µ is a MAC computed by the provider idp .
Typically, the value hr is a hash of a destination record of the form
D = [id k q k m k a k τ ]

(3.5)

id is the identity of the destination, q is a sequence number, m is a metric (typically hopcount), τ is an absolute value of time, and a is an auxiliary value which provides additional
information regarding the path to the destination with identity id. However, depending on
the specific nature of the protocol the interpretation of the values may differ.

3.4.5

Protocol Parameters

TMMs recognize the following protocol specific parameters:
1. δn : maximum age of neighbor time-stamp;
2. ∆: validity period for destination records.
3. Qx : current sequence number of TMM X
4. M AX: Maximum size of neighbor table
5. IN F : Hop count considered as unreachable
6. ∆W : Waiting period
7. ω: specifies the protocol in use
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When the TMM is turned on for the first time these parameters are initialized to their
default values. To securely load this information the key distribution center can provide
the required information securely using the shared secret KX . Additionally as we shall see
in later chapters, not all parameters are used for all protocols.

3.4.6

MACs

TMMs verify/compute many types of MACs:
1. µr : MACs for time-stamped destination records;
2. µt : MACs for time-stamps;
3. µa : Acknowledgment MACs; and
4. µs : self-MAC
A MAC of the form µr is computed to securely convey the hash of destination record from
one TMM to another. To convey a DR with hash hr to a neighbor A, TMM X computes
(at time tx )
µr (X, A) = h(hr k tx k 0 k KXA )

(3.6)

A time-stamp MAC of the form µt is computed by X for verification by B
µt (X, B) = h(tx k tx k 0 k KXB ).

(3.7)

An acknowledgment MAC µa to acknowledge a MAC µr is computed by A
µa (A, X) = h(hr k ta k 1 k KAX ).

(3.8)

An acknowledgment MAC µa to acknowledge a time-stamp MAC µt is computed by B as
µa (B, X) = h(tx k ta k 1 k KAX ).
44

(3.9)

The shared pairwise secrets used for computing MACs µr , µt and µa are typically
stored in the neighbor table of the TMM.
A self-MAC is computed by a TMM X for verification by itself at a later time. For this
purpose a secret known only to the TMM (self-generated inside the TMM) is used. Three
types of self-MACs are recognized by TMMs, represented as µs , µaux and µset .
The self-MAC µs is computed by X using a secret SX known only to X as a response
to a valid authentication record submitted to the TMM with a MAC µr , under some conditions. For example, in response to an authentication record A = [A k hr k ta k 0 k
µr (A, X)] submitted to TMM X, the TMM may compute
µs (X) = h(A k hr k r k SX ).

(3.10)

where r is a value which depicts the internal state of the TMM. The self-MAC is a memorandum issued by the TMM to itself, bound to a state r. In this particular scenario the
memorandum states that “a value hr was provided by A” when the TMM state was r. This
self-MAC is accepted by the TMM only if the TMM is in state r. For self-MACs that
should be accepted regardless of TMM state, the self-MAC is issued against a state r = 0.
This value of r is also stored within a TMM.
Further details about r, and MACs µaux and µset are provided in later chapters.

3.5

TMM Functions
In the proposed approach TMMs are housed in MANET nodes. These TMMs are ca-

pable of establishing pairwise secrets with each other using strategies which demand low
overhead for operations to be performed inside the trusted boundary of TMMs. These pair45

wise secrets are used for computing message authentication codes (MAC). Nodes communicate with their TMMs using fixed and well-defined interfaces - by writing into the input
registers of the TMM and reading time-stamped MACs from the output registers of the
TMM. Such MACs accompany MANET routing packets sent by nodes.
An important prerequisite for a trustworthy module to warrant trust is that the TCB
functions executed inside the module are simple, and consequently, easily verifiable. Simple TCB functions can also be implemented as hardwired logic (software-free), thus rendering moot a wide range of attacks that attempt to modify software. It is also desirable
that the modules consume as little power as possible, and consequently disseminate negligible heat, as such modules can be physically well shielded from deliberate and accidental
intrusions. With these self-imposed limitations on TCB functions, aimed at improving the
reliability of TMMs while simultaneously lowering their cost, we seek a set of simple TCB
functions for MANETs.
Now we present few TMM interfaces that are exposed to the node housing the TMM.
These functions perform generic actions, and hence can be used by a TMM irrespective of
the employed protocol.
1. Initialize(): employed by all protocols; This function is used to securely load the
protocol parameters to their default values.
2. SendTS() : employed by all protocols;
3. UpdateNeighborTable() : employed by all protocols;
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3.5.1 SendTS()
This method is used to compute authenticated time-stamps (µt ) for all the neighbors
listed in the neighbor table N as shown in equation 3.7. Usually this function is invoked
to authenticate periodic HELLO messages sent to all neighbors except for those whose
status l == 3. The message included in these HELLO messages is the time at which the
MACs (µt ) are computed. The algorithm followed by SendTS() can be seen in Figure 3.5.1.
SendTS() { //

create time-stamp MAC for every entry in N
µt (1) · · · µt (M AX) = 0;
t = tx ;
FOR i = 0toM AX // M AX is the maximum size of neighbor table
N = N (i) = [idn k Kpw k t0 k l]; // row i of N
IF ((idn 6= 0) ∧ (l 6= 3))
µt (i) = h(t k t k 0 k Kpw );
RETURN µt (1) · · · µt (M AX), t;
}
Figure 3.1
Function SendTS()

3.5.2 UpdateNeighborTable(A)
UpdateNeighborTable() is used to update the neighbor table (N )that is internally stored in

the TMM. It can either update existing records based on received packets, or can add/delete
neighbor records. The function accepts an authentication record (A) as input.
When the function is invoked to either add or delete neighbor records (identified by
µ == 0) the interface first tries to find out the index of the passed neighbor identity (id)
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by using an internal function called f indindex(). A neighbor record (id k Kpw k 0 k 0)
is added to N , if the requested neighbor is not already present in N (f indindex() returns
0).
However when a record for neighbor id does exists, the TMM treats this as a request
to either revoke or remove the neighbor. The TMM would remove neighbor records that
either: i) has a status l 6= 3, and is expired (t0 + δn + ∆ < tx ), or ii) has status l == 3, and
are expired (t0 < tx ). Additionally, the TMM would revoke the neighbor, by setting its
status to 3, if: i) the neighbor was not heard for δn seconds; the TMM revokes the neighbor
for the next ∆ seconds, or ii) X requested to revoke the neighbor; the TMM revokes the
neighbor for the next 2∆ seconds.
Every packet received by a node X is first submitted to UpdateNeighborTable(), where
the corresponding neighbor record of the sender (id) is updated. The TMM X first authenticates the submitted packet by recomputing the value of µ. If verified, it computes
an acknowledgment MAC µa for information (hr ) received in the packet. Later the TMM
modifies the record for neighbor id by updating the status l and latest time-stamp t0 fields.
Finally if the packet was received from a bidirectional neighbor (l == 2), and if it is
neither an acknowledgment (ACK 6= 1) nor a time-stamp (hr 6= t) the TMM X computes
a self-MAC µs for the received value hr as shown in equation 3.10.
A more detailed description of UpdateNeighborTable() can be found in Figure 3.5.2.
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{
//A = id k hr k t k ACK k µ
µa = µs = 0;
i = f indindex(N , id);
//N (i) = [id k Kpw k t0 k l] //stored neighbor record
IF (µ == 0) //no MAC - add or delete neighbor
IF (i == 0) //add neighbor
Kpw = h(KX k id) ⊕ hr ) //hr is MLS public value
N (i) = [id k Kpw k 0 k 0] //insert record
ELSE //delete neighbor
IF ((t0 + δn + ∆ < tx ) ∧ (l 6= 3))
N (i) = [0 k 0 k 0 k 0]; //delete record
ELSE IF ((t0 + δn < tx ) ∧ (l 6= 3))
N (i) = [id k 0 k t0 + δn + ∆ k 3];
ELSE IF ((t0 < tx ) ∧ (l == 3))
N (i) = [0 k 0 k 0 k 0]; //delete record
ELSE
N (i) = [id k 0 k tx + 2∆ k 3];
ELSE //update neighbor record
0
k t0 k l0 ]
N0 = N (i) = [id0 k Kpw
0
)
IF (µ == h(hr k t k ACK k Kpw
tc = tx ;
0
µa = h(hr k tc k 1 k Kpw
); //compute ACK
0
IF ((t > t ) ∧ (ACK == 1))
0
N (i) = [id k Kpw
k t k 2];
ELSE IF (t > t0 ) ∧ (ACK == 0)
IF (l0 == 2) //neighbor already listed as bidirectional
0
k t k 2];
N (i) = [id k Kpw
ELSE
0
N (i) = [id k Kpw
k t k 1];
IF (ACK == 0) ∧ (hr 6= t) ∧ (l0 == 2)
µs = h(id k hr k r k SX ); //self-MAC
RETURN µa , µs , tc
}
UpdateNeighborTable(A)

Figure 3.2
Function UpdateNeighborTable(A)
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3.5.2.1

Usage of UpdateNeighborTable()

Consider a scenario where a node X enters a subnet and recognizes the presence of nodes
A, B and C within its range. At this point, while node X recognizes its neighbors,
the TMM of X does not. The TMM of X recognizes a node A as a neighbor only if a
time-stamped and authenticated MAC (authenticated using secret KXA ) is provided to the
TMM.
Node X uses the UpdateNeighborTable() function to add nodes A, B and C to its neighbor table with status l = 0. As the pairwise key for A, B and C is available after this step,
now X can invoke SendTS() to obtain time-stamped MACs µt , which would authenticate
X to these neighbors. On receipt of the HELLO packet, A submits the time-stamped MAC
to its UpdateNeighborTable() resulting in the addition of X as a neighbor with status l = 1.
For every packet submitted to UpdateNeighborTable(), the function returns the corresponding acknowledgment MAC µa . Hence A would acknowledge the received HELLO, and
now X could list A as a bidirectional neighbor. Finally, an acknowledgment from X to A
would list X as a bidirectional neighbor of A.
In the same way, a list of neighbors are maintained in the neighbor table of all TMMs,
characterized by the link status and the latest time-stamp. Periodically, nodes may send
supercilious HELLO packets to ensure that the TMMs of neighboring nodes recognize
their presence. The MACs necessary to authenticate HELLO packets can be obtained by
invoking SendTS().
Additionally, the function UpdateNeighborTable() allows a node X to revoke its neighbor (say A). X would revoke a neighbor A when:
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• X is experiencing a weak link with neighbor A. Usually X is supposed to hear from
each of its neighbors for every δn seconds. However when X is experiencing a weak
link with A, it might not hear from A for more than δn seconds. In this instance X
would revoke the neighbor A for the next ∆ seconds.
• X identifies that A is misbehaving. Now X can revoke A for the next 2∆ seconds.

X would not send or receive packets from a node it revoked until the revocation timer
(stored as t0 ) expires.

3.5.3

Supplementary Functions

Apart from the above explained functions the TMM X has a few internal functions
which can be invoked to perform specific reusable tasks. The function checkbd(id) (as
shown in Figure 3.5.3) is used to verify whether id is currently a bidirectional neighbor.
The function verifies the status of id (whether l == 2) and also checks whether id was
last heard recently enough (tx − t0 < δn ). If satisfied, the function returns 1 indicating that
id is a verified bidirectional neighbor; else, it returns 0.
Additionally the function computemacs(hr , idp , j) is used to compute verifiable MACs
µr as shown in equation 3.6. When j == 0 the function returns MACs for every listed
bidirectional neighbor in N except idp . However when j == 1 it only computes MAC for
idp . Figure 3.5.3 details the pseudo code for this function. In order to verify the bidirectionality status of neighbors this function uses the above mentioned checkbd() interface.
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checkbd(id) {
i = f indindex(N , id);
N = N (i) = [idn k Kpw k t0 k l];
IF ((id == idn ) ∧ (l == 2) ∧ (tx − t0 < δn ))
RETURN 1;
ELSE
RETURN 0;
}
Figure 3.3
Function checkbd(id)

computemacs(hr , idp , j) {
IF (j == 0) //compute macs for all bidirectional neighbors except idp
µr (1) · · · µr (M AX) = 0; t = tx
FOR i = 1 · · · M AX
N = N (i) = [idn k Kpw k t0 k l];
IF ((idn 6= 0) ∧ (idn 6= idp ) ∧ checkbd(idn ))
µr (i) = h(hr k t k 0 k Kpw )
RETURN µr (1) · · · µr (M AX), t;
ELSE //compute MAC only for idp
i = f indindex(N , idp );
N = N (i) = [idn k Kpw k t0 k l];
IF ((idn == idp ) ∧ checkbd(idn ))
µr = h(hr k t k 0 k Kpw )
RETURN µr , t;
}
Figure 3.4
Function computemacs(hr , idp , j)
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CHAPTER 4
BASIC TCB FOR ON-DEMAND PROTOCOLS

In this chapter we propose a simple and efficient TCB for on-demand Protocols which
can be leveraged to improve the performance of MANETs by i) providing assurances that
reduce the scope of attacks that can be launched by attackers, and by ii) reducing the
overhead required for leveraging the TCB. As explained earlier in the proposed approach
simple TCB functions are executed inside trustworthy MANET modules (TMM) housed
in every MANET node. We assume that only the TMMs are trusted: the rest of the node all other hardware and software - are untrusted.
Every routing packet received by a node X provides information about a specific destination. Node X uses this accumulated information to carry out the routing process. In
order to ensure security X should be prevented from illegally modifying or creating superfluous routing data. Ideally to satisfy this requirement routing data should be stored within
trusted boundaries, and thereby preventing unwanted modifications. However, the TMMs
housed in each node are severely resource constrained, and hence internally storing all the
gathered routing data is not practically feasible.
Therefore in order to maintain the integrity of routing data every received routing
packet is signed by a self-MAC µs = (hr k id k r k SX ). Whenever X decides to
use the routing information (represented by hr ) it has to submit the corresponding µs that
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authenticates it. In this fashion a TMM would prevent a node from illegally modifying
received routing data. Hence a node caches all the received routing information (hash of
which is represented as hr ) along with the appropriate MAC µs .
For the discussion provided in this chapter the value of the field r is always set to 0, as
we assume that the TMM does not change its state. Further details about r are provided in
subsequent chapters.
In this chapter we present an interface AtomicRelay() which, along with the other functions explained in Section 3.5, can be used to realize both AODV and DSR on-demand
routing protocols. Both the protocols start their route establishment process by broadcasting a RREQ, to which a corresponding RREP is generated either by a destination, or by
an intermediate node that has fresh enough route. The main difference between the two
protocols is that in AODV a requesting node obtains the hop distance and next-hop information by the end of a successful route establishment; while in DSR the entire path to the
destination is known.
In both the protocols prematurely expired paths are handled by RERR packets. The
function AtomicRelay() identifies a RERR packet when the value of hr is extended by the
flag IN V . A routing packet includes a destination record (DR) D = [id k q k m k a k τ ],
and as explain in Section 3.4.4 the value of hr = h(D). While forwarding this DR the
value of hr is extended as: hr = h(hr k IN V ).
For the discussion provided in this chapter the packet represented by hr is a RERR
when IN V = 1.
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4.1 AtomicRelay(D, idp , µs , IN V, ω)
TMM X exposes the function AtomicRelay() so that the node could submit the routing
information it wants to send, along with the corresponding MAC µs . The inputs accepted
by this function are:
1. a DR D = [id k q k m k a k τ ]
2. identity of the provider idp
3. self-MAC µs
4. flag IN V , ω
The flag ω indicates the underlined protocol (ω = DSR or AODV ). A detailed algorithm
for AtomicRelay() is provided in Figure 4.1.
When µs == 0 the TMM X interprets this as a request to create a DR about itself.
Now the internally stored sequence number Qx is incremented by 1, and later a DR for
X is constructed. Later the TMM computes the value of hr and invokes the function
computemacs(hr , X, 0) to authenticate it to all the stored bidirectional neighbors.
If the function is invoked to relay a previously received information (µs 6= 0), the
TMM X first computes the value of hr and verify it against the submitted self-MAC µs .
When idp (the provider of hr ) is still a bidirectional neighbor the TMM X builds a new
DR by updating the values of m and a. When the implied protocol is DSR (ω == DSR)
the value of a is extended to include the identity of X. Finally the corresponding hr of the
newly constructed DR is authenticated to all the bidirectional neighbors of X except idp .
However when idp is no longer a bidirectional neighbor of X, the TMM sets m =
IN F, a = 0. The value of hr is computed by setting the flag IN V = 1, and later is
authenticated to all the current bidirectional neighbors of X.
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AtomicRelay(D, idp , µs , IN V, ω) {

//D = id k q k m k a k τ
IF (µs == 0) //create a DR for relaying
qx = Qx + +; //Qx is maintained in persistent storage
IF (ω == DSR) a = h(a k X)
hr = h(X k qx k 0 k a k tx + ∆)
hr = h(hr k 0)
RETURN computesmacs(hr , X, 0); //compute MAC for all bidirectional neighbors
hr = h(h(D) k IN V )
IF (µs == h(hr k idp k 0 k SX )) //relay a DR
IF (checkbd(idp ))
IF (m 6= IN F ) m = m + 1;
IF (ω == DSR) a = h(a k X);
hr = h(h(D) k IN V );
ELSE //RERR creation - neighbor lost
m = IN F ; a = 0;
hr = h(h(D) k 1); //indicates that this is a RERR
RETURN computesmacs(hr , idp , 0); //MACs for all neighbors except idp
}
Figure 4.1
Function AtomicRelay(D, idp , µs , IN V, ω)
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4.2

Realizing AODV and DSR
When TMM enabled nodes are used in a MANET subnet employing AODV/DSR the

only difference is that along with plain routing packets, every node sends some additional
values - a clock-tick value and some MACs. RREQ and RERR packets are accompanied
by one MAC for every bidirectional neighbor. RREP and data packets are accompanied
by one MAC for the next hop.
HELLO packet exchange and neighborhood establishment are performed as explained
in Section 3.5.2.1 by using the functions UpdateNeighborTable() and SendTS().
A RREQ packet contains information about its creator (source). It would also list
details about the required destination (like its identity and last known sequence number),
which are unmodified while forwarding a RREQ. Let hi represent the hash of such constant
fields. To create a RREQ for destination D, node X invokes the function AtomicRelay()
with µs = 0, a = hi , and IN V = 0. The function would construct a DR about X (with
a = hi ) and compute verifiable MACs to all the listed bidirectional neighbors of X. Note
that the TMM increments the internally stored sequence number Qx while creating such a
DR. Therefore we ensure that the sequence number of a node is incremented whenever it
requests an RREQ. This would prevent a bad node from sending un-wanted RREQs that
will increase network overhead.
Now suppose A is a neighbor of X that has received the RREQ from X and does
not have a path to D. Further B is a neighbor of A (but not a neighbor of X) that has a
valid path for D (say B received this information previously from its neighbor P ). Firstly
A would invoke the function AtomicRelay(), and submit the received RREQ and the cor57

responding self-MAC (A would obtain the self-MAC when it first submits the received
packet to its UpdateNeighborTable()). The TMM A would generate verifiable MACs that
could be used for relaying the RREQ. Now when B receives the RREQ it would create
a RREP by submitting the previously received routing information from P and the corresponding µs value to its AtomicRelay(). The TMM B would now increment the value
of m and returns verifiable MACs (µr ) to all the neighbors of B. However, since RREP
is unicast, B would only include the MAC verifiable by A, and ignore the rest of the µr
values returned by AtomicRelay().
It has to be noted that even though B created the RREP it actually is relaying the
information it previously received from P . Node B could only do this if:
• the information has not expired yet,
• and P is still present as a bidirectional neighbor to B.

For instances where a destination (say D) needs to create a RREP, the function AtomicRelay()

is invoked with µs = 0, and a = hi . The value hi is a one-way function on all

the constant values included in the RREP. The TMM D would create DR about itself and
would authenticate it to all the listed bidirectional neighbors. As explained earlier, since
RREP is a unicast, D would only include the MAC verifiable by the node to whom the
RREP is forwarded to.
In addition to the process followed above, for DSR (ω == DSR) the value of a
is extended to include the node’s identity while forwarding DRs. This ensures that a
represents the cumulative hash of the source path included in DSR packets. For instance
in the above example the source path included in the RREQ received by B is (X, A), and
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the value of a = h(h(hi k X) k A), where hi is hash of the immutable fields included by
the node X that created this packet.
The value of hr in all the above mentioned calculations is computed with the flag
IN V = 0, as the corresponding DR does not represent a RERR. Now suppose if B lost
its connectivity to P , it (node B) is required to generate a RERR for destination D. B
would do this by invoking AtomicRelay(), and resubmit the DR (it received from P ), and
the corresponding µs to authenticate this DR. TMM B determines that P is no longer
a bidirectional neighbor, and will modify the DR by setting m = IN F, a = 0. This
modified DR is authenticated it to all the neighbors of B. Node A would forward this
RERR by submitting the received DR to its AtomicRelay() with IN V = 1.

4.3

Security Offered by Proposed TCB

In this section we investigate the security offered by the TMMs. We follow an informal
approach, by explaining these assurances using natural language. We first establish assertion statements (as Lemmas), and later use these statements to prove the various security
features offered by the TMMs.

4.3.1

Assertion Statements

Lemma 1. A node X can not obtain the secrets KX and SX that are internally stored
inside the TMM X
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Proof. The TMMs are assumed to be read-proof and write-proof. To justify the ability
to read-proof we deliberately reduce the complexity of operations performed inside the
boundary to ensure unconstrained physical shielding.
Lemma 2. A node X can not directly change the internally stored neighbor table N
Proof. The neighbor table N is stored internally in TMM X. As explained in Lemma 1,
the TMMs are well shielded, and hence any data structure that is internally stored cannot
be directly accessed by node X.
Lemma 3. A node X can not modify the received destination record (DR), before submitting it to its TMM interface UpdateNeighborTable().
Proof. Each routing packet sent in the network includes a MAC µr that is used to authenticate the information (DR) conveyed in the packet. As shown in equation 3.6, µr is
calculated over hr (hash of the DR) using the shared secret Kpw . Additionally node X has
to submit every received packet (hr ) to the function UpdateNeighborTable(), which verifies
hr by recomputing the value of µr .
Since node X does not know the value of Kpw (the secret used in computing µr ), any
changes to the received packet will be identified by the function UpdateNeighborTable(),
and hence will not be accepted. Therefore node X can not modify the received packet
before submitting it to the function UpdateNeighborTable().
Lemma 4. A node X can not modify a DR signed by its TMM before relaying it.
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Proof. The proof for this statement is similar to the one presented for Lemma 3. A TMM
signs a DR using the shared key Kpw . Any changes to this DR, by node X, would be
identified by the TMM of the receiving node, and hence would be dropped.

4.3.2

Assurances Offered by TMMs

Theorem 4.3.1. A node X can not make illegal changes to received routing information.
Proof. The routing information (DR) received in a packet is authenticated using the MAC
µr . Lemma 3 states that X can not modify received DRs before submitting them to
its TMM. Further, the TMM has an interface that handles all the required changes that
need to be made to the received DR. In our case the function AtomicRelay() makes these
changes. Finally after making the changes, the TMM signs the modified DR, and return
the corresponding MACs (µr ) to the node X.
Lemma 4 states that a node can not modify DRs that are signed by its TMM. Hence
node X is inhibited from introducing any illegal changes to the received DR.
Theorem 4.3.2. The TMM X only accepts routing packets from bidirectional neighbors
of node X.
Proof. Every packet received by X should be first submitted to the function UpdateNeighborTable().

This function is encoded in such a way that it only outputs the self-MAC µs

when the packet was received from a bidirectional neighbor. Function like AtomicRelay(),
which are used for further processing the received DR, requires µs as its input. They use
it to authenticate the received DR.
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Further, Lemma 2 states that X can not modify the internally stored neighbor table
N . Hence routing packets are only accepted from bidirectional neighbors.
Theorem 4.3.3. Sending a false RERR packet would penalize node X.
Proof. The DR required to create a RERR message can only be produced by calling the
function AtomicRelay(). To obtain this DR node X has to submit a DR with finite height
(m < IN F ), and whose provider (say A) is no longer listed with a status l == 2 in the
neighbor table N .
Node X could generate a fictitious RERR, by manually deleting the bidirectional link
to A. X could do this by calling the function UpdateNeighborTable() as described in Section 3.5.2. However doing so would mean that X can not use A as a bidirectional neighbor
for a period 2∆. The risk of loosing a neighbor (and thereby links to other nodes through
that neighbor) can be an effective deterrent against attacks based on creating superfluous
RERR messages.
Theorem 4.3.4. TMMs does not allow nodes to collude together.
Proof. Lemma 1 states that a node can not expose the secrets that are stored within its
TMM. Further Theorem 4.3.1 proved that a node can not introduce illegal changes to
received routing packets. Hence TMMs prevent nodes from colluding together.
The above mentioned security goals, viz.,
1. ensuring that routing records cannot be modified illegally
2. ensuring that routing records will be accepted only from nodes with tested bidirectional links and will be relayed only to nodes with tested bidirectional links,
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3. regulating RERR creation, and
4. addressing collusion based attacks

are achieved by performing trivial operations inside the TMM.
A TMM can only make a node to accept authenticated DRs, and ensure that changes
to received DRs are made adhering to the protocol. However, the TMM cannot force the
node to broadcast a packet as the communication interfaces are not included within trusted
boundaries. Hence explicit provisions are required to discourage nodes from maliciously
dropping packets. It is for this purpose we provide a node the ability to revoke a neighbor
from its neighbor table N . Nodes which identify selfish behavior by neighbors can simply
remove the identified selfish neighbor. Therefore the selfish node would loose connectivity
with these nodes for the next ∆ or 2∆ seconds. Hence, unwarranted dropping of packets
can result in a node being disconnected from the network as the neighbors of the node
would remove the node from their neighbor list.
In other words, active attacks (involving illegal modifications to routing packets) are
addressed by TMMs by ensuring that the rules governing the underlying routing protocol cannot be violated. Passive attacks involving selective or selfish participation are addressed by the nodes through their ability to eject nodes from their “logical neighborhood”
- the neighborhood as seen by the TMM of the node.

4.3.3

Limitations

In DSR a node gets to know the entire path to the destination by examining the included
source path. This additional information can be used to reduce the overhead created by
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future RREQ packets. Even though the proposed scheme provides RREP creation by
intermediate nodes, it does not support the usage of cached source paths in DSR.
Moreover, due to the physical limitations of a TMM accumulated routing data has to
be stored outside the trusted boundaries. Hence even though a node cannot alter received
information, it can hide the presence of a specific record. For instance in the example
mentioned in Section 4.2 B could hide the presence of the valid DR for D (which it
previously received from P ), and forward the RREQ it received from A. The TMM B
cannot identify this selfish behavior, as it has no information about the records currently
stored at the node B. Node B would do this in order to prevent its presence in the final
path between X and D, and thereby can skip forwarding unrelated traffic. This would
allow B to preserve its resources from forwarding others packets.
Apart from hiding received DRs a node could also advertise stale routing information.
For instance say an attacker X has a valid DR (D = [D k q k m k a k τ ]), and the
corresponding MAC µs for destination D, which was provided by neighbor A. Now when
X receives a RERR from A, it would forward the RERR after invalidating the stored DR
as D0 by setting m = IN F and a = 0. However the TMM cannot remember this change
of information since the DR D is not stored within trusted boundaries. Therefore when X
later on receives a RREQ for D, it can continue to use the stale information it has for D
(D, µs ). X can continue to use this stale DR until the expiry of its validity time.
In oder to prevent above mentioned malicious behaviors, a TMM should have the
knowledge of the destination records currently stored at the node housing it. Hence before
forwarding a DR for a destination (say D) a node has to present to its TMM the existing
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DR for D. Enforcing such a rule would prevent nodes from hiding, or replaying stale
DRs. Additionally, to support the usage of cached routes the TMM should also be able
to verify the auxiliary information (source paths) included in the routing packet. In this
regard we designed a data structure “Index Ordered Merkle Tree (IOMT)” which could be
used to securely maintain the integrity of dynamic database of records that are stored in an
untrusted location.
Every leaf of IOMT corresponds to a unique destination, and a parent node is computed
as a one-way function of its children. Hence the root of the tree binds all the DRs stored
as leaves, and is stored inside the TMM. Whenever a node desires to advertise a DR it
would submit the corresponding leaf, and a set of “instructions” that map the leaf to the
root. Since the value of the root is stored within trusted boundaries, the TMM can validate
the submitted DR by mapping it to the root using the provided instructions. A detailed
description of IOMTs is provided in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
INDEX ORDERED MERKLE TREE
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Figure 5.1
A Binary Merkle tree with 16 leaves.

A binary Merkle-tree [59] is a hash tree where a single value (root of the tree) can be
used to authenticate multiple values (leaf nodes of the tree). A merkle tree is constructed
using two functions both of which can be derived from a cryptographic hash function h()
(say SHA-1). A function vi = hl (li ) maps a leaf value li to an intermediate node vi at
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height 0; a function z = he (x, y, f ) maps two intermediate nodes at height n − 1 to their
parent node at height n using the flag f .
Figure 5 depicts a merkle tree with N = 16 leaves and height L = 4. As mentioned
above a verifier (that has access only to the root v0f ) can confirm the existence of a leaf li ,
when provided with the value of the leaf li , and a set of v “instruction” (which are used to
re-compute the root).
For example to prove that l4 is part of the tree, a prover provides L = 4 instructions
(v5 , 0), (v67 , 0), (v03 , 1) and (v8f , 0). Each instruction has two values with the first being a
hash, and the second value is an “order-bit” which specifies how to use the included hash.
A verifier first computes v4 = hl (l4 ), and later derives the following values x = h(v4 k v5 ),
x = h(x k v67 ), x = h(v03 k x) and x = h(x k v8f ). Note that the order-bit specifies
the order of the concatenation. The final value is compared against the root stored in the
verifier to confirm the value of the provided leaf l4 .
To change the value of a leaf (say from l4 to l40 ) a prover submits the following information: i) the new value l40 , ii) set of v instructions, iii) justification for the change. The
verifier validates the provided justification, and if satisfied makes the necessary change,
and computes the new root as demonstrated above.

5.1

Index Ordered Merkle Tree
In general, a leaf li , 1 ≤ i ≤ N may contain a record with a record-index i ∈ I where

|I| >> N . For example, I could be the space of 128-bit IPv6 addresses or 48-bit MAC
addresses, but N may be substantially smaller (for example, thousands).
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For the cases with N > |I| each leaf can correspond to a particular ordered-index. For
instance, ith leaf can represent an entity with index i. Now in order to prove the presence
of an entity with record-index i, a verifier asks for the ith leaf, and the corresponding set
of instructions. Similarly to change the ith leaf, a prover submits the new value, set of
instructions and justification for the change. After verifying the justification the verifier
can update the ith leaf and the final root.
Contrary to the above case, when |I| >> N only a small subset of values in I are
actually associated with leaves l1 · · · lN . Now when a verifier requests for a specific record
(say with index i), the prover has to either provide the requested record, or prove that no
such record currently exists. Without such a requirement a prover can add multiple records
for index i, and can later replay obsolete information about i, which is undesirable.
In general a leaf of IOMT li is of the form (i, θ, i0 ), where i is record-index of the leaf.
θ is pre-image resistant hash of the record stored for this index. The third value specifies
that the tree does not have records whose indices are enclosed in (i, i0 ).
A value x is enclosed by (i, i0 ) if i < x < i0 , or if x < i0 < i, or if i0 < i < x.
If i = i0 all values are enclosed - implying that i is the only leaf in the tree. The set of
all current leaves are thus virtually ordered based on an index. where each index points
to the next available index. The highest index wraps around and points to the lowest
index. This approach is used in NSEC records in DNSSEC [64] (domain name system
security) for providing authenticated denial of queried records. An NSEC record of the
form (abc.example.com, abf.example.com) proves that no record pertaining to a name
abe.example.com exists.

IOMT combines NSEC and Merkle hash trees.
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The root of the IOMT is initially set to zero indicating that all the leaves are empty
(initialized to (0, 0, 0)). The first inserted leaf points to itself. In order to add a leaf (C, θC ),
the prover has to demonstrate that a record with index C is not present as a leaf. For this it
has to provide: i) a leaf that includes C (say (A, θA , E), ii) an empty leaf (0, 0, 0), and iii)
the respective v instructions to verify both the leaves. When C is inserted, the leaf of A is
changed as (A, θA , C) so that it now points to C, and the empty leaf is set to (C, θC , E).
Similarly, when deleting a leaf with an index S, the prover needs to provide: i) the leaf
of S (say (S, θS , T )), ii) the leaf that is pointing to S (say (P, θP , S)), and iii) the respective
v instructions to verify both the leaves. To finish the deletion, the leaf for P is modified as
(P, θP , T ) to point to the leaf that was initially pointed by S, and the leaf of S is emptied
to (0, 0, 0).
As can be seen from the above examples, the process of either adding or deleting a leaf
requires modifying two leaves simultaneously. Consider a scenario where two leaves (say
l1 and l6 ) need to be modified concurrently. Note that the leaves l1 and l6 have a common
parent (v07 ) at height n = 3. To modify both leaves simultaneously, verifier is provided
with
1. the old leaves l1 and l6 ;
2. n − 1 = 2 instructions (v0 , 1) (v23 , 0) to reach the left-child (v03 ) of the common
parent, starting from v1 = h(l1 );
3. n − 1 = 2 instructions (v7 , 0) and (v45 , 1) to reach the right-child v47 of the common
parent, starting from v6 = hl (l6 ); the verifier can now compute the common parent
v07 = h(v03 k v47 ).
4. L − n = 1 instruction(s) (in this case (v8f , 0)) to reach the root from the common
parent, where L is the height of the tree; and
5. the new leaves l10 and l60 (along with the justification for the changes).
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After verifying that l1 and l6 are part of the tree, and the justification provided, the verifier
can now compute a new root starting from values v10 = hl (l10 ) and v60 = hl (l60 ), using the
same set of 2 × (n − 1) + L − n instructions.

5.2

IOMT Functions
Every routing packet received by a node contains information about a specific desti-

nation. A node stores this information for future routing purposes. Additionally apart
from routing data, some protocols require nodes to store some auxiliary information. In
some instances this auxiliary information reduces the routing overhead, while in other it is
mandatory to make routing decisions. For instance, in DSR a node can cache source paths
and later use them to respond to future RREQs. This reasonably reduces the overhead
incurred by future route creations. On the other hand, in TORA a node is required to store
heights of all its neighbors. This information is used to maintain multiple paths, and is
required to determine whether a node has lost its last downstream link.
Hence apart from normal routing data in most cases a node is also required to store
additional auxiliary information. For this purpose we propose to have two IOMTs: i) main
IOMT to store routing data, and ii) auxiliary IOMT to store auxiliary data. The roots of
these two trees are stored internally within the TMM.
Apart from the protocol parameters (as specified in Section 3.4.5) the TMM also stores
the values: r and ra , where r is the root of main IOMT, and ra is the root of auxiliary
IOMT. Moreover the leaf of a IOMT is represented as:
L = [i k θ k i0 ]
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(5.1)

where i is identity represented by the leaf, θ is the information stored about i, and i0 is
the next available identity pointed by this leaf. θ = 0 means that no information is stored
regarding the identity i, and is termed as an uninitiated leaf.
Additionally, the TMM has an internal function he () defined as:




x
if y = 0







 y
if x = 0
he (x, (y, b)) =



h(x k y) if b = 0







 h(y k x) if b = 1

(5.2)

This function is used to map two leaves x and y to their parent, and the value of he (0, (0, b)) =
0.

5.2.1

Merkle Tree Functions

In this section we present various internal TMM functions that are required to carry
out different merkle tree operations. These functions are not exposed to the node, and can
only be invoked by the TMM itself. Figure 5.2.1 outlines the steps followed in each of
these functions.
The function hve (x1 , v = {(y1 , b1 ) · · · (yn , bn )}) is used to map an internal node x1 to
a node at a higher level using v instructions. Further the function mapleaf (L, v) is used
to map the leaf L to the root, and returns the computed value of the root.
In Section 5.1 we saw that two leaves have to be modified either while inserting or
deleting a node. For this purpose the TMM calls the function mapleaves(Ll , Lr , vlr ). The
function first maps the passed leaves to their corresponding intermediate nodes xl and xr
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respectively by utilizing the function hl (). The passed instruction set vlr = {vl0 , vr0 , vp0 },
where vl0 and vr0 are the instructions that are used to map the leaves Ll and Lr to their
common parent. In this regard mapleaves() internally calls the function hcp (xl , vl0 , xr , vr0 ).
Finally the common parent returned by hcp () is mapped to the root by applying the vp0
instructions.

5.2.2

AddDeleteLeaf(Ll , Lr , id, vlr , tree)

The function AddDeleteLeaf() is used to either add or delete a leaf from IOMT. In this
regard the TMM utilizes an internal function checkencloser((i, j), k) which verifies if k
is enclosed by the values i and j. The pseudo code for the function checkencloser(), and
AddDeleteLeaf() can

be found in Figure 5.2.2.

The inputs to the function AddDeleteLeaf() are thus
1. id, identity that needs to be deleted/inserted.
2. two leaves Ll = (i, θi , i0 ) and Lr = (j, θj , j 0 );
3. a sequence of instructions vlr
4. a flag tree that specifies the tree to be operated on
The proposed TMMs have two IOMTs, and the flag tree = (M AIN or AU X) is used
to identify the tree that needs to be modified. Later the TMM tries to map the two leaves
to the root using the function mapleaves().
Now if the tree is empty (root == 0), the TMM adds the first leaf into the tree by
modifying the leaf L0l = (id, 0, id). However if the tree is non empty, and if the function is
invoked to add an identity, the TMM identifies the empty leaf among Ll and Lr . Assume
that Ll is empty (i == 0), now the TMM performs the following steps:
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Function hve () to map an internal node x0 to a node at a higher level
hve (x1 , {(y1 , b1 ) · · · (yn , bn )}) {
FOR i = 1 · · · n
xi+1 = he (xi , (yi , bi ));
RETURN xi+1 ;
}

Function to map a leaf to the root
r = mapleaf (L, v) {
x = h(L);
RETURN hve (x, v);
}

Function to map two nodes to a common parent
hcp (xl , vl0 , xr , vr0 ) {
IF (xl 6= xr )
ξl = hve (xl , vl0 );
ξr = hve (xr , vr0 );
RETURN h(ξl k ξr );
ELSE //xl == xr
RETURN xl ;
}

Function to map two leaves to the root
r = mapleaves(Ll , Lr , vlr ) {
xl = hl (Ll );
xr = hl (Lr );
//vlr = {vl0 , vr0 , vp0 }
p = hcp (xl , vl0 , xr , vr0 )
RETURN hve (p, vp0 );
}
Figure 5.2
Merkle Tree Algorithms
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1. verify that (j, j 0 ) encloses id (to ensure that no leaf for id exists currently);
2. create leaf L0r = (j, θj , id) to replace Lr ;
3. create leaf L0l = (id, 0, j 0 ) to replace Ll ;
4. update root.

When the function is invoked to delete id, the TMM first identifies the leaf that’s
representing id. Suppose Lr = (j = id, θj , j 0 ) should be replaced with L0r = (0, 0, 0).
Now the steps taken by the TMM are
1. verify θj = 0 and i0 = id;
2. create L0r = (0, 0, 0) and L0l = (i, θi , j 0 ) to replace Lr and Ll ;
3. update root.

TMM ensures that it can delete only uninitiated leaves (θ = 0).
Whenever a node X gets information about a new identity (say id) that is not already
present in its IOMT, the function AddDeleteLeaf() is invoked to create a place-holder for
id. AddDeleteLeaf() adds an uninitiated leaf L (whose θ = 0) to the IOMT to represent id.
The TMM needs to offer additional functions, that can be used by X, to later update L to
represent the newly arrived information about id.
Similarly when the information stored for the identity id has expired, the TMM offers
functions which would uninitiate the leaf representing id. Now X can invoke AddDeleteLeaf() to

delete this uninitiated leaf.

Further details on these additional TMM functions are presented in subsequent chapters.
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checkencloser((i, j), k) {
RETURN ((i < k < j) ∨ ((i > j) ∧ (k > i)) ∨ ((i > j) ∧ (k < j)));
}

AddDeleteLeaf(Ll , Lr , id, vlr , tree) {

//Ll = [i k θi k i0 ];
//Lr = [j k θj k j 0 ];
IF (tree == M AIN )
root = r;
ELSE
root = ra
x = mapleaves(Ll , Lr , vlr );
IF (x == root)
IF (root == 0) //inserting first leaf
L0l = [id k 0 k id]
ELSE IF (i == 0) ∨ (j == 0) //inserting a leaf
IF ((i == 0) ∧ checkensloser(j, j 0 , id))
L0l = [id k 0 k j 0 ]
L0r = [j k θj k id]
ELSE IF (j == 0) ∧ (checkensloser(i, i0 , id))
L0l = [i k θi k id];
L0r = [id k 0 k i0 ];
ELSE //deleting a leaf
IF (id == i) ∧ (θi == 0) ∧ (j 0 == i)
L0l = [0 k 0 k 0];
L0r = [j k θj k i0 ];
ELSE IF (id == j) ∧ (θj == 0) ∧ (i0 == j)
L0l = [i k θi k j 0 ];
L0r = [0 k 0 k 0];
root = mapleaves(L0l , L0r , vlr );
IF (tree == M AIN )
r = root;
ELSE
ra = root;
}
Figure 5.3
Functions for Adding and Deleting Leaves
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CHAPTER 6
SECURING ON-DEMAND PROTOCOLS USING IOMT

MANET nodes accumulate routing information that needs to be stored within them
self. In this chapter we present the idea of using IOMTs to prevent a node from misrepresenting or hiding this accumulated information. As explained above, during routing
process nodes gather two types of information: i) routing data, and ii) auxiliary data.
Therefore we proposed the idea of having two trees, where the main IOMT can be used to
store routing data, while the auxiliary IOMT handles auxiliary information.
In this chapter we propose the design of TMMs that can be used to secure AODV
and DSR routing protocols. Hence the auxiliary information stored in a node corresponds
to source paths received in DSR routing packets. In DSR every node appends it address
before forwarding a routing packet. Therefore, a node is aware of the entire path taken by
the received packet. This path information included in routing packets is termed as source
paths (S). Nodes can use this data to respond to future RREQs, and thereby considerably
reducing the overhead incurred by those requests.

6.1

IOMT Design for TMM
In this section we provide more details about the main and auxiliary IOMTs that are

used to store accumulated information.
76

6.1.1

Main IOMT

In general, every routing packet contains information about a specific destination. This
information is extracted as a destination record (DR), and as shown in Equation 3.5 a DR
for D is of the form: DD = [D k q k m k a k τ ]. These accumulated DRs are stored as
leaves of main IOMT. Each leaf corresponds to a unique destination identity, and the leaf
representing D is of the form:
Li = [D k θD k D0 ]

(6.1)

where D0 is the next available destination pointed by this leaf, and
θD = h(h(DD ) k idp )

(6.2)

where idp is the neighbor that provided this DR.

6.1.2

Auxiliary IOMT

The auxiliary IOMT is used to hold gathered source paths. Consider a packet that has
traversed through nodes A, B, C and reached a node X. Now the value a included in the
DR received by X is of the form:
a = h(h(h(hi k A) k B) k C)

(6.3)

where hi is hash of the protocol constants included in the packet by node A. Hence for
DSR, the value a is a cumulative hash of the source path included in the packet. Therefore
we design our auxiliary IOMT to hold this hash value, and each leaf corresponds to a
unique value of a.
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The leaf representing the source path received in the DR for D (DD = [D k q k m k
a k τ ]) is of the form:
L = [a k (θ = τ ) k a0 ]

(6.4)

where a0 is the cumulative hash that represents the next available source path. Additionally,
the expiry period of the source path represented by a is the expiry time of the DR that
delivered a (which is τ ). Hence this value is stored in the leaf as θ.

6.2

Usage of Source Paths

Cached source paths can be used to respond to future RREQs. However RREPs generated by intermediate nodes using stored source paths cannot include the sequence number
of the destination. In MANETs sequence numbers are used by nodes to identify latest information. Usually information associated with a greater sequence number are preferred,
and hence every RREP generated in the network is associated with the latest sequence
number of the destination. Contrary, intermediate nodes generating replies based on obtained source paths cannot provide this information.
Considering this limitation, and to make use of the optimizations provided in DSR, a
node will unicast the received RREQ towards the destination, along the known source path.
Unicasting an RREQ (rather than broadcast) would considerably reduce the bandwidth it
consumes to reach the listed destination. On receiving this RREQ a destination would
generate a RREP that includes its latest sequence number.
Now consider an example where node X has a source path S = (P, Q, R, S, T ), and it
receives a RREQ for destination Q. Ideally we want X to respond back with a RREP based
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on the stored path S. Since X can not provide the sequence number of Q, we propose that
X unicast the RREQ along the path T, S, R, Q to reach the destination.
Therefore, X will unicast the RREQ to T , and within the RREQ includes two values:
i) the path that can be used by T (which is (S, R, Q), and ii) the length of this path (in this
case 3). Node T on receiving this RREQ is forced to either use the path specified by X,
or one that has fewer hops (say T has a different source path S0 = (P, Q, A, T ), where the
number of hops to reach Q is only 2). In this fashion the RREQ is unicast to destination
Q, which on receiving the packet responds back with a RREP that has its latest sequence
number.
However in scenarios where a node receives an RREQ unicast, and when the suggested
path is no longer valid, the node broadcasts the RREQ. Say in the previous example T lost
its connectivity to S, and therefore the path suggested by X is no longer valid at T . Now
T would broadcast the RREQ it received from X.
Each leaf of the auxiliary IOMT represents a source path that details information about
multiple nodes. For instance in the above example at node X, the leaf representing S
provides information about nodes: P, Q, R, S, and T . As stated above, these leaves are
indexed based on the cumulative hash a, rather than the identities of the nodes included
in the source path. Hence, it would be computationally impractical for a TMM to answer
the following question: “is there a valid leaf that represents a source path, which provides
information about the requested destination?”. In order to securely answer this question,
the TMM has to scan through all the leaves searching for the requested destination identity,
for every received RREQ packet.
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Therefore a feasible solution is to present a choice on the usage of source paths. In the
previous example node X can also broadcast the RREQ (requesting for Q) without using
the stored source path. Nevertheless, when a node decides to unicast a RREQ, every node
down the line is forced to unicast it as long as the suggested source path is valid. As shown
in the above case, node T receiving the RREQ unicast from X is bound to either use the
source path listed in the packet, or one that has fewer hops. Hence, the initial trigger for
a RREQ unicast is optional, but a node that initiates this process forces all the subsequent
nodes to unicast the RREQ.
Finally, it is to be noted that a node would look into available source paths only when it
does not have a valid destination stored for the destination (DR with m < IN F ). A node
has to respond with a RREP to the received RREQ (irrespective of whether the RREQ
was received either by a broadcast or unicast) if it has a valid height to the requested
destination.

6.3

TMM Data Structures
Apart from the parameters defined in Section 3.4.5, the TMM also holds two values:

i) r: root of main IOMT, and ii) ra : root of auxiliary IOMT. The values of r and ra are
initially set to 0 (which signifies that they are empty), and their value keeps changing as
information is added into the corresponding IOMT.
In Section 3.4.6 we defined that the self-MAC µs (X) = h(idp k hr k r k SX ) is bound
to the current state of the TMM. We define the state of the TMM based on the routing
information currently stored at the node. Since the basic TCB, proposed for securing on80

demand protocols (design presented in chapter 4), does not contain any information about
the currently stored routing data we assumed that the value of r = 0. However when
designed based on IOMT, a TMM stores the root of the main tree that contains all the
currently stored destination records (DRs). Hence, the value of µs (X) is computed over
the root of the main IOMT r, and is considered valid until r is unchanged.

6.3.1

Self-MAC µaux

Along with the specifications provided in Section 3.4, the TMM issues a new selfMAC µaux which is utilized for securely unicasting RREQ packets. Its value is computed
by TMM X as:
µaux (X) = h(id k idn k n k am k ra k SX )

(6.5)

where id is identity of the destination, idn is the node to whom RREQ should be unicast,
am is a cumulative hash of the path suggested by X to idn , and n is hop distance between
id and idn while using the path represented by am . Unlike µs , µaux is tied to the root of
auxiliary IOMT ra , and is valid until ra is unchanged.
The IN V flag was previously used to distinguish between RERR and normal routing
packets. However in this chapter, when IN V = 1 it represents that the received packet
is a RREQ, and that it was unicast by the sender. Hence in the example shown in Section 6.2, when X decides to unicast the RREQ, it has to submit to its TMM the self-MAC
µaux (X) = h(id = Q k idn = T k n k am k r k SX ), where am is cumulative hash
of the source path that should be present at T . Now TMM X would construct a DR for
Q as DQ = [Q k q k m = n k a = am k τ ]. Finally the value of hr is computed as:
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hr = h(h(DQ ) k IN V = 1). Hence IN V = 1 indicates that the DR is sent via unicast,
and that the values of a and m received in the DR represent the suggested path and its
length respectively.
Now suppose that T receives the RREQ unicast (sent by X), and that it does not have
the requested path. To represent this state, the TMM T would compute µaux (T ) with
id = Q, idn = n = 0, and a = am . Such a self-MAC indicates that T does not have a
valid leaf for the requested value am in its auxiliary tree.

6.4

TMM Functions
Apart from the various functions listed in Sections 3.5 and 5.2, the TMM exposes the

following interfaces:
1. Update(),
2. Maintenance(),
3. CreateDR(),
4. SendDR(),
5. CheckPath() and
6. SendInvDR()
The function Update() is used to process received DRs with IN V 6= 1. It updates the
leaves of the main and auxiliary trees based on the received DR. Maintenance() is invoked
to handle maintenance activities like invalidating stored DRs and auxiliary values. The
interface CreateDR() is used to create DRs either: i) for the node itself, or ii) from an
uninitiated leaf (θ = 0). Conversely, the function SendDR() is used to relay currently
stored DRs. Self-MAC µaux is created using the function CheckPath(), and the process
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of securely unicasting RREQ packets (as explained in Section 6.2) is carried out by the
function RelayInvRR().

6.4.1 Update(D, µs , idpw , Li , vi , Do , idpo , Lj , vj , ω)
This function is used by node X to update currently stored information based on the
received DR. A detailed description of the algorithm can be found in the Figure 6.4.1.
The inputs accepted by this function are:
1. received DR D = [idw k qw k mw k aw k τw ]
2. provider idpw of the received DR, and the corresponding self-MAC µs
3. stored DR Do , and its provider idpo
4. leaf of the main tree Li that represents Do , and the corresponding instruction vi to
map it to the root r.
5. leaf of the auxiliary tree Lj that represents aw , and the corresponding instruction vj
to map it to the root ra .
6. a flag ω that represents the underlined protocol.

The function first maps the received DR D to the self-MAC µs . This function only accepts DRs whose IN V == 0, and hence computes the corresponding hr = h(h(D) k 0).
Additionally, the function does not accepts DRs that have smaller sequence number. Later,
the TMM maps the two leaves Li and Lj to their corresponding roots; and also checks if
they indeed represent information about the received destination (idw ) and auxiliary value
(aw ) respectively.
When ω == DSR, and the received DR has a finite height (mw < IN F ), the TMM
updates the leaf Lj that stores information about aw .
Later the TMM updates the stored DR Do based on the received information (D) when:
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1. received a greater sequence number,
2. received a equal or better height,
3. received DR from provider (idpw == idpo ),
4. has no information currently stored for idp w (leaf Li is uninitiated with θi == 0).
Finally the TMM X updates the value of θi to represent the changes done to Do , and
lastly would update the root r.

6.4.2 Maintenance(D, idp , Li , vi , hi )
This function is used by a node X to maintain stale information. The pseudo code of
the function can be found in Figure 6.4.2. It takes the following inputs:
1. stored DR D
2. provider identity idp
3. a leaf Li and the set of instructions vi that map it to the root.
4. a initial hash hi
When the function is invoked to maintain stored DRs (hi == 0), the TMM X will
un-initialize the leaf (sets θi = 0) if the DR has expired. Additionally, when the provider
of the DR is no longer listed as a bi-directional neighbor, the TMM identifies it as a loss
of link. In order to advertise this change the TMM creates a new DR
D0 = [id k q k m = IN F k a = 0 k τ ]

(6.6)

and authenticate it to all the neighbors of X. Finally the stored DR is updated by setting
m = IN F + 1, a = 0, and q = q + 1. Later the TMM updates the leaf, and finally the
root r to reflect these changes to the stored DR.
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Update(D, µs , idpw , Li , vi , Do , idpo , Lj , vj , ω) {

//D = [idw k qw k mw k aw k τw ] //received record
//Do = [ido k qo k mo k ao k τo ] // stored record
//Li = [i k θi k i0 ]; //leaf for stored record
//Lj = [j k τj k j 0 ]; //leaf from aux tree
hr = h(h(D) k 0); //hash of received record (assumed that INV flag is 0)
z = h(hr k idpw k r k SX ); //verify self-mac
IF ((z 6= µs ) ∨ (qw < q)) RETURN ERROR;
x = mapleaf (Li , vi );
y = mapleaf (Lj , vj );
p = h(h(Do k idpo )) //verify θi
IF ((x 6= r) ∨ (y 6= ra ) ∨ ((θi 6= 0) ∧ (p 6= θi )) ∨ (ido 6= idw ) ∨ (ido 6= i) ∨ (j 6= aw ))
RETURN ERROR;
IF ((mw < IN F ) ∧ (ω == DSR)) //add aux value to aux tree
L0j = [j k τw k j 0 ];
ra = mapleaf (L0j , vj );
IF ((qw > qo ) ∨ (mw ≤ mo − 1) ∨ (idpw == idpo ) ∨ (θi == 0))
qo = qw ; mo = IN F ; τo = τw ; ao = aw ;
IF (mw 6= IN F ) mo = mw + 1;
hr = h(Do ); θi = h(hr k idpw );
r = mapleaf (Li , vi );
}
Figure 6.1
Function Update()
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However when a stored source path needs to be maintained, the value hi is a cumulative
hash of the stored path except the provider idp . The corresponding leaf is un-initialized
either when the path has expired (θ ≤ tx ), or provider idp is no longer listed as a bidirectional neighbor. Finally the TMM X updates the root ra to reflect these changes.

6.4.3 CreateDR(Li , vi , ω)
The function CreateDR() is used by node X to create DRs about itself; and if requested,
can also create DRs about destinations that have uninitiated leaves (X has no information
stored for them). The algorithm for the function can be see in Figure 6.4.3. The function
takes the following inputs:
1. a leaf Li and the set of instructions vi that map it to the root r.
2. flag ω that determines the protocol.
When invoked the TMM first increments the stored sequence number Qx . Further it
creates a DR about X, and authenticate it to all the listed bidirectional neighbors.
Additionally, when an uninitiated leaf Li is passed as input, the function initializes the
DR for the destination identity i. Later it updates the values of θi and r subsequently to
reflect these changes. Finally the TMM X computes verifiable MACs, for all bidirectional
neighbors, over the initialized DR.

6.4.4

SendDR(Li , vi , D, idp , ω)

This function is used to relay stored DRs, and the algorithm followed can be seen in
Figure 6.4.4. The inputs accepted by this function are:
1. stored DR D
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Maintenance(D, idp , Li , vi , hi ) {

//D = [id k q k m k a k τ ] // stored record
//Li = [i k θi k i0 ];
x = mapleaf (Li , vi );
p = h(h(D) k idp );
IF (hi == 0) //maintenance of stored routing record
IF ((x == r) ∧ (p == θi ) ∧ (id == i))
IF (τ ≤ tx ) //expired record
θi = 0;
ELSE IF (checkbd(idp ) == 0) //invalid record
m = IN F + 1; q = q + 1; a = 0
θi = h(h(D) k idp );
D0 = [id k q k m = IN F k a = 0 k τ ]
hr = h(h(D0 ) k 0);
computemacs(hr , X, 0);
r = mapleaf (Li , vi );
ELSE //maintenance of aux record
IF ((x 6= ra ) ∨ (i 6= h(hi k idp ))) RETURN ERROR;
IF ((checkbd(idp ) == 0) ∨ (θi ≤ tx )) //expired or invalid aux record
θi = 0;
ra = mapleaf (Li , vi );
}
Figure 6.2
Function Maintenance()
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CreateDR(Li , vi , ω) {
//Li = [i k θi k i0 ];
x = mapleaf (Li , vi );
Qx + +;
IF(ω == DSR) a = h(a k X)
D = [X k Qx k n k a k tx + ∆];
hr = h(h(D) k 0);
computemacs(hr , X, 0);
IF ((x == r) ∧ (θi == 0))
D = [i k 0 k IN F k 0 k 0];
θi = h(h(D) k idp = 0);
r = mapleaf (Li , vi );
hr = h(h(D) k IN V = 0);
computemacs(hr , X, 0);
}

Figure 6.3
Function CreateDR()

2. provider identity idp
3. a leaf Li and the set of instructions vi that map it to the root.
4. flag ω that determines the protocol.

The TMM X first verifies the leaf Li by checking if it indeed represents the values
stored in DR D, and later maps it to the root r. If satisfied, D is authenticated to all the
bidirectional neighbors of X, and the value of hr is computed by setting IN V = 0. When
the protocol is DSR (ω == DSR) and DR has finite height, the stored auxiliary value is
extended to include the identity of the node X. Additionally, when m == (IN F + 1),
the submitted DR was recently modified due to a link loss. Hence in such scenarios, the
stored sequence number q is decremented by 1 before sending the DR.
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SendDR(Li , vi , D, idp , ω) {
//D = [id k q k m k a k τ ] //stored record
//Li = [i k θi k i0 ]; //leaf for stored record
x = mapleaf (Li , vi );
p = h(h(D k idp )) //verify θi
IF ((x 6= r) ∨ (i 6= id) ∨ (p 6= θi ) RETURN ERROR;
IF ((checkbd(idp )) ∧ (tx < τ ))
IF ((ω == DSR) ∧ (m < IN F ))
a = h(a k X);
q 0 = q;
IF (m == (IN F + 1))
q 0 = q − 1;
0
0
D = [id k q k m k a k τ ]
hr = h(h(D0 ) k 0);
RETURN computemacs(hr , idp , 0);
}

Figure 6.4
Function SendDR()

6.4.5 CheckPath(Li , vi , hi , n, (id1 · · · idn ))
This function is used by node X to obtain the self-MAC µaux that is used while unicasting RREQ packets. It accepts the following inputs:
1. a leaf of the auxiliary tree Li = [a k θa = τa k a0 ], and the corresponding instructions vi
2. initial hash hi
3. a set on n nodes (id1 · · · idn ), where id1 is the required destination, and idn is the
node that provided the auxiliary value a.
The leaf Li represents a source path S whose cumulative hash is the value a. The value
hi is a cumulative hash that represents all the nodes in S until the destination id1 . For
instance if S = (P, Q, R, S, T ) and id1 = R, the value of hi = h(h(hp k P ) k Q) (hp is
hash of the constants included by P ), and the three nodes (R, S, T ) are passed as inputs to
the function CheckPath().
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It can be noted that in the above example a = h(h(h(hi k R) k S) k T ). The TMM
uses an internal function extend(hi , n, (id1 · · · idn )) to extend the value of hi to include
the n nodes (id1 · · · idn ). The algorithm for extend() and CheckPath() can be found in
Figure 6.4.5.
The TMM X first maps the leaf Li to the root ra , using the vi instructions. An uninitiated leaf Li (θa == 0) indicates that X does not have a source path identified by a, and
hence creates the self-MAC as:
µaux = h(id1 k 0 k 0 k a k ra k SX )

(6.7)

However when θa 6= 0, the TMM X extends the value of hi by the passed n nodes
(id1 · · · idn ) to verify that Li indeed points to the indicated source path. Now the TMM
verifies whether the leaf is still valid by checking: i) that the leaf has not yet expired, and
ii) the provider idn is still a bi-directional neighbor. If satisfied, the TMM X identifies that
Li points to a valid source path that includes the destination id1 . Hence node X can use
this path information to unicast a RREQ to the provider idn , and in this regard computes
the self-MAC as
µaux = h(id1 k idn k n − 1 k y k ra k SX )

(6.8)

where y is the cumulative hash of the source path that should be used by idn to forward
the RREQ. It can be easily observed that the length of this indicated source path is n − 1.
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x = extend(hi , n, (id1 · · · idn )) {
x = hi ;
FOR i = 1 : n
x = h(x k idi );
OUT x;
}

CheckPath(Li , vi , hi , n, (id1 · · · idn )) {

//Li = [a k τa k a0 ]
x = mapleaf (Li , vi );
IF (x == ra )
IF (τa == 0)
µaux = h(id1 k 0 k 0 k a k ra k SX );
ELSE
y = extend(hi , n, (id1 · · · idn ))
IF ((a == y) ∧ (τa > tx ) ∧ (checkbd(idn )))
y = extend(hi , n − 1, (id1 · · · idn−1 ));
µaux = h(id1 k idn k n − 1 k y k ra k SX );
RETURN µaux ;
}
Figure 6.5
Function CheckPath()
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6.4.6 SendInvDR(Li , vi , Do , idpo , Dw , IN V, idpw , µs , X, µaux )
This function is used by node X when it receives a DR (say for a destination id) with
either m == IN F or IN V == 1, and even X has a DR with infinite height stored for id.
This function is used to carry out the RREQ unicast process as explained in Section 6.2.
The pseudo code followed by the function can be see in Figure 6.4.6.
The inputs accepted by this function are:
1. received DR D = [idw k qw k mw k aw k τw ]
2. provider idpw of the received DR, the corresponding self-MAC µs , and the flag IN V
3. stored DR Do , and its provider idpo
4. leaf of the main tree Li that represents Do , and the corresponding instructions vi to
map it to the root r.
5. self-MAC µaux , and the set X = [id k idn k n k am ] that contains the values used
in the computation of µaux .
The TMM X first verifies the received DR by using the input IN V flag. It later maps
the provided leaf to the root using the vi instructions, and also checks whether the leaf
indeed points to the DR Do . Finally the TMM verifies the self-MAC µaux , if it is not null
(id 6= 0), by using the values passed in the set X.
Additionally, this function should only be invoked by X when:
1. received an invalid DR for destination idw
2. the stored DR for idw has infinite height, or X has an un-initialized leaf for idw
The TMM X ensures that these conditions are satisfied by verifying the received and
stored DRs.
The TMM uses a flag if lag which when set determines that the received DR should be
unicast to idn (the neighbor indicated in µaux ). When Dw is received by unicast (IN V ==
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1) the TMM expects a non-NULL µaux which either specifies: i) a smaller path than mw
(sets if lag to 1), or ii) that the suggested path aw is not valid (sets if lag to 0).
However when IN V == 0 and id 6= 0, X is requesting to start the unicast process,
and hence the TMM sets if lag = 1.
Finally if if lag == 1 the TMM creates a DR whose m = n, and a = am . TMM
X unicast this new DR only to the node idn . However when if lag == 0 the TMM
broadcasts a DR, whose m = IN F and a = 0, to all the bidirectional neighbors.

6.5

Realizing AODV and DSR
In this section we detail how the above mentioned functions can be used by a node X

to realize AODV and DSR routing protocols. Firstly, the function UpdateNeighborTable()
can be used to maintain connectivity, and to obtain the self-MAC µs . MACs for periodic
HELLO messages can be obtained from SendTS(). Every packet received by X is first
submitted to UpdateNeighborTable().
Additionally, the function AddDeleteLeaf() can be used to create place holders for identities that were recently known to X. Suppose when X receives a DR about destination
D for the first time, X would invoke AddDeleteLeaf() to create an un-initialized leaf for D
in the main IOMT. This newly created leaf, along with the received DR, can be submitted
to Update() for further processing. Similarly when X receives a new source path (whose
cumulative hash is not present in auxiliary IOMT), X would invoke AddDeleteLeaf() to
create an un-initialized leaf for this newly arrived information.
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SendInvDR(Li , vi , Do , idpo , Dw , IN V, idpw , µs , X, µaux ) {

//Dw = [idw k qw k mw k aw k τw ] - received record
// if INV=1 in received record, a path a of length m is suggested to forward the record
//Do = [ido k qo k mo k ao k τo ] - stored record
//Li = [i k θi k i0 ]; // leaf for stored record
//X = [id k idn k n k am ] //verified path to id from aux tree
IF ((ido 6= idw ) ∨ (i 6= ido )) RETURN ERROR;
hr = h(h(Dw ) k IN V )
IF (µs 6= h(hr k idpw k r k SX )) RETURN ERROR;
x = mapleaf (Li , vi ); p = h(h(Do ) k idpo );
IF ((x 6= r) ∨ (p 6= θi ) ∨ ((IN V == 0) ∧ (mw < IN F )) ∨ ((θi 6= 0) ∧ (mo < IN F )))
RETURN ERROR;
IF (id 6= 0) //self-MAC µaux is not NULL
IF (id 6= ido ) RETURN ERROR;
IF ((µaux 6= h(id k idn k n k am k ra k SX )) ∨ (checkbd(idn ) == 0))
RETURN ERROR;
if lag = 0;
IF (IN V == 1) //path suggested by received record
IF ((id == 0) ∨ (n > mw − 1)) RETURN ERROR; //no path information provided
IF ((n == 0) ∧ (am == aw )) //suggested path is not usable
if lag = 0;
ELSE IF (n ≤ mw − 1)//suggested path or better path
if lag = 1;
ELSE
RETURN ERROR
ELSE IF (IN V == 0) ∧ (id == ido ) ∧ (n < M AX))
//previous hop did not, but X is suggesting a path
if lag = 1;
ELSE IF (IN V == 0) ∧ (id == 0)) //broadcast DR
if lag = 0;
IF (if lag)
D0 = [id k qw k n k am k τw ];
hr = h(h(D0 ) k 1);
RETURN computemacs(hr , idn , 1) //compute only one MAC for idn
ELSE
D0 = [id k qw k IN F k 0 k τw ]; hr = h(h(D0 ) k 0);
RETURN computemacs(hr , idp , 0); //compute MACs for all except provider;
}
Figure 6.6
Function SendInvDR()
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When X desires to create a RREQ for a destination (say D) it invokes the function
CreateDR(),

and passes an un-initialized leaf for D. The function first increments the

sequence number Qx , and later creates a DR about X. Additionally, it also computes a
DR for D with an infinite height (m = IN F ). Both these DRs are authenticated to all the
bidirectional neighbors of X. Hence in our approach a RREQ packet contains two DRs:
i) a DR about the source which includes its latest sequence number, and ii) a DR (with
m == IN F ) about the destination. A node A receiving these two DRs would process
them separately. While first DR updates the currently stored information about X, the
second one is used to forward the received RREQ.
It can be observed that whenever X creates a RREQ its sequence number is incremented. Hence X is charged (by increasing its sequence number) for using the network.
This would prevent a node from generating un-wanted RREQs aimed at creating extra
traffic to launch denial of service attacks.
Suppose when A does not have a path for D, A would submit the received and stored
DR for D to the function SendInvDR(). Since A does not have a path to D, the function
would return a DR for D that has infinite height. Additionally, A can get the updated DR
about X by calling the function SendDR(), which can be used to relay stored DRs. The
RREQ forwarded by A would include these two DRs.
In the above process while relaying the received RREQ, node A is required to also
submit the stored DR for D, while calling the function SendInvDR(). This would prevent
A from selfishly hiding valid paths for requested destinations.
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Now say when A has a path to D, it has to respond back with an RREP. Now A can
submit the stored DR for D to the function SendDR(), which would authenticate it to all
the bidirectional neighbors of A. Nevertheless, since this RREP should only be unicast
back to X, A would only include the MAC µr that is verifiable by X, and ignore the rest
of the MACs returned by SendDR().
For scenarios where a destination (say D) is required to respond back with an RREP,
the function CreateDR() is invoked by passing NULL for all the parameters. This would
make CreateDR() to create a DR only about the node.
Finally expired leaves in both main and auxiliary IOMTs can be cleared by calling the
function Maintenance().

6.5.1

Creation of RERR

In both AODV and DSR when a node X loose a bidirectional link to a neighbor (say A),
X creates a RERR packet for all the DRs provided by A. Lets assume X created a RERR
for destination D. In this RERR packet the hop count for the unreachable destination
is set to m = IN F , and the sequence number q is unchanged. However in order to
prevent routing loops, on-demand protocols like AODV and DSR require X to increment
the sequence number (q 0 = q + 1) stored for D. This ensures that X would only accept
RREPs (for D) that has a sequence number greater than q 0 .
The function Maintenance() is used to carry out the above logic. For the above example
X would invoke Maintenance(), and pass the DR for D (say DD ) as input. The TMM X
would create a DR with m = IN F , a = 0 and authenticate it to all the neighbors of X.
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Further it would increment the sequence number stored in DD . The TMM X also sets
m = IN F + 1, which indicates that the DR is modified based on a recent link loss at
node X. Such an indication is required when X desires to resend the RERR packet. In
such a scenario (when X wants to resend the RERR), X would invoke SendDR() to relay
DD . Now the TMM X can verify that m == (IN F + 1), and relay a RERR packet (with
m = IN F , and q = q − 1) after decrementing the stored sequence number for D.

6.5.2

RREQ Unicast for DSR

Accumulated source paths can be used in DSR to unicast RREQs towards the specified
destination. For suppose in the above example say A has a source path (P, D, Q, R, S),
and received a RREQ for D from X. Now when A does not have a path for D, it could use
the stored source path to unicast the received RREQ towards D. For this purpose A would
require to obtain a self-MAC µaux = [D k S k 3 k am k r k SA ], where S is the node to
whom the RREQ should be unicast, am represents the cumulative hash of the source path
that could be used by S (which is (P, D, Q, R)), and 3 denotes that by using this path S is
three hops away from D. A can acquire this certificate by calling the function CheckPath(),
and by passing the auxiliary leaf that points to the stored source path (P, D, Q, R, S).
Now A would pass this certificate to the function SendInvDR(), along with the received
and stored DR for D. SendInvDR() would authenticate the passed inputs, and compute a
DR with m = 3, a = am , and IN V = 1. By setting the flag IN V = 1, the TMM A
indicates to the receiver of this DR (in our case S) that it (S) should further unicast the
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RREQ using a source path that has a path length of at most m = 3 hops, and that the
suggested path’s cumulative hash is am .
Now when S receives this RREQ unicast from A, it can either use the suggested path,
or one which has fewer hops that 3 (say a source path (X, D, Y ), where S is only 2 hops
away from D). For the selected path, S would obtain the corresponding self-MAC µaux
by calling the function CheckPath(). Later S would invoke SendInvDR() to further unicast
the RREQ along the selected path.
However when S does not have a valid source path to further carry on the unicast
process, it has to broadcast the received RREQ. Such a scenario would arise, say when S
lost its connectivity with the neighbor R. In this regard, S first has to prove to its TMM
that the suggested path (represented by a = am in the received DR) is not valid, which
means that S has to provide an un-initialized auxiliary leaf for am . S could obtain this leaf
by calling the function AddDeleteLeaf(). However a leaf for am can not be added when S
already has an auxiliary leaf representing am . This would prevent S from hiding the path
suggested in the received DR.
Now S would pass this newly created un-initialized leaf to the function CheckPath(),
which issues a self-MAC µaux that signifies that S does not have the suggested path am .
Later X would submit µaux and the received DR to SendInvDR(), where the TMM verifies
if the auxiliary values included in both µaux and the received DR are identical (am == a).
Finally the TMM would return MACs which authenticate the received DR to all the bidirectional neighbors of S. By utilizing these MACs S can broadcast the received RREQ.
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6.6

Analysis of IOMT design

In this section we analyze the security offered by TMMs when IOMTs are used to store
acquired routing data. The design of the TMMs using IOMT is an extension to the basic
TCB proposed in chapter 4. Hence all the security features mentioned in Section 4.3 are
also offered when IOMTs are used along with TMMs. Additionally, employing IOMT
guarantees that a node can not hide or replay stale information. Further, the proposed
design also enables a node to securely use cached source paths to forward future RREQs.
In this section we present informal proofs to these additional features.

6.6.1

Assertion Statements

Lemma 1. A modification to the information stored in a leaf, would change the root of
the IOMT.
Proof. According to the property of a merkle tree, and therefore even for IOMT, the root
of the tree can be used to map all the leaves of the tree. Hence, the root represents the state
of the information currently stored in an IOMT. According to its design, every leaf of an
IOMT stores information about a specific identity. Whenever this information is modified,
even the root has to be updated to reflect these changes.
In the proposed TMM functions, whenever a function updates the information stored
by a leaf, the TMM ensures that it also updates the root of the IOMT.
Lemma 2. In a given IOMT, every leaf represents information about a unique identity.
Proof. A node X has to invoke the function AddDeleteLeaf() to add a leaf that represents
an identity (say j) thats not already present in the IOMT. Before making this addition the
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function requires an input leaf L = (i, θ, i0 ), where (i, i0 ) encloses the newly added identity
j. If a leaf for j already exists in the IOMT, it would be impossible for X to produce a leaf
that encloses j. Hence the function AddDeleteLeaf() can only add a leaf that represents an
identity thats not yet present in the IOMT.
Further as AddDeleteLeaf() is the only function that can be used to add leaves, we can
claim that every leaf in an IOMT represents a unique identity. For the main IOMT every
leaf represents a DR about a unique destination, while for auxiliary IOMT, every leaf
represents a unique source path.
Lemma 3. While processing a received routing packet about a destination D, the TMM
also requires the internally stored DR for D.
Proof. The only two functions that can be used to process received DRs are Update(), and
SendInvDR().

While Update() handles received DRs with finite height (m < IN F ) or

those sent with IN V == 0, the function SendInvDR() is used to process received DRs
with infinite height (m == IN F ). Both these functions require the internally stored DR
as their input, and hence the statement is proved.
Lemma 4. The self-MAC µaux can be used by node X to indicate information about a
stored source path.
Explanation: The value of µaux == h(id k idn k n k am k r k SX ). When idn = n = 0,
µaux indicates that X does not have a valid source path represented by a.
However when ((idn 6= 0) ∧ (n 6= 0)), µaux indicates that X has a valid source path
which can be used to reach destination id. Further it conveys that the next node in this path
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is neighbor idn , which should have a source path as represented by am , and that by using
this indicated path idn is n hops away from destination id.
Node X can obtain this self-MAC by invoking the function CheckPath().

6.6.2

Assurances Offered by the TMMs

Theorem 6.6.1. A node X can not hide or replay stale DRs for a destination D.
Proof. Lemma 3 states that in order to process a received routing packet, node X has to
submit the stored DR it has for D. This would prevent X from hiding information about
D, while processing routing packets regarding D.
According to Lemma 1 whenever TMM X updates the stored DR for D, it would
also update the root of the main IOMT. Further, Lemma 2 states that X can only have a
single DR for D currently stored in main IOMT. Therefore X can not replay a stale DR
for D.
Theorem 6.6.2. Suppose node X received hop counts 4, 3, and 2 subsequently from neighbors A, B, and C respectively (say for a destination D). After processing all these DRs,
in the order they are arrived at X, node X can not advertise a height based on the heights
it received either from A or B.
Proof. Lemma 2 states that X can have only a single leaf in its IOMT that represents
destination D. Further according to Lemma 3, X has to submit the stored DR for D while
processing routing packets about D. Since in this example the DRs received by X has
finite heights, the function Update() has to be invoked to process these received DRs.
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The function Update() is encoded in such a way that the stored DR is updated (more
specifically the values of hop count (m), and provider idp are changed) whenever X receives a smaller height. As the hop count advertised by C is the smallest, after processing
all the three received DRs, the stored DR is updated based on the DR sent by C.
Again according to Lemma 2 X can have only a single DR stored for D in its main
IOMT. Hence the TMM X would update this DR whenever it receives a smaller height.
Therefore at the end of processing all the three DRs, the TMM X can only advertise the
stored DR for D, which is updated based on the hop count received from C.
Theorem 6.6.3. For a RREQ packet that is being unicast towards a destination D, at every
hop the source path used to forward this RREQ is decreasing in length. In absence of a
required source path, the RREQ would be broadcast.
Proof. The function SendInvDR() is used to forward RREQs. When X receives a DR that
has its flag IN V = 1, X is required to submit a µaux whose am == a, where a is the
auxiliary value received in the DR. When ((idn 6= 0) ∧ (n 6= 0)), the TMM X expects
a path shorter than the one indicated in the DR. The TMM X would accept µaux only
when these conditions are satisfied, and would forward the DR (that represents the RREQ
packet) to idn with IN V = 1.
Additionally when idn = n = 0, this indicates that the requested source path is no
longer valid at X. Hence the TMM X, would broadcast the DR.
Therefore, whenever the RREQ is unicast the TMM ensures that it is being forwarded
in the path whose length is decreasing. But when a valid source path is not available the
RREQ is broadcast.
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CHAPTER 7
COLLISION RESISTANT TORA

Broadly the applications of MANETs can be divided into two types: i) those that provide connectivity between any two pairs of nodes, and ii) those that provide connectivity
only to a few set of nodes. For example of the former application consider a group of
ad hoc devices deployed in a hostile environment that require peer communication. Additionally, a classic example of the later application could be an ad hoc network that is
established to extend the reach of a few base-stations. In such a scenario all the nodes in
the MANET desire to establish a path to the available base-stations over multiple hops.
Routing protocols like AODV and DSR which establish routes on demand, and provide minimal latency are better choices for applications that require peer communications.
However the proactive version of TORA presents itself as a good choice for applications
that require the advertisement of only a few nodes.

7.1

Shortcomings of TORA
Consider a simple subnet topology depicted in Figure 7.1.
After the OPT from the destination φ is propagated the heights of the node will be:

(rl, 0, φ), (rl, 1, A), (rl, 2, C), (rl, 2, B), (rl, 3, G), (rl, 3, E), and (rl, 3, F ), where rl
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Figure 7.1
A Subnet running TORA

denotes the reference level and is rl = (0, 0, 0). Assume that the link C → A goes down
at time τ . The sequence of events that will transpire are then as follows:
a) C generates a new RL rl0 = (τ, C, 0) by sending a UPD with height (rl0 , 0, C); G
takes no action as it still has downstream neighbors E and F ;
b) F propagates the new RL by sending a UPD with height (rl0 , −1, F ); even after this
link reversal G has a downstream neighbor E, hence no action is taken.
Clearly, TORA strives to reduce the number of control packets required to deal with
changes in topology, and does this well. Where TORA does not do so well is in scenarios
that result in partitioning of the subnet. To see this consider a scenario where A looses its
link to destination φ at time τ . The sequence of events in TORA will be as follows:
a) A → UPD (rl, 0, A) (A generates new RL rl = (τ, A, 0));
b) B → (rl, −1, B); C → (rl, −1, C) (B and C propagate new RL);
c) E → (rl, −2, E) and F → (rl, −2, F ) (E and F propagate new RL);
d) G → (rl0 , 0, G) (G reflects RL as rl0 = (τ, A, 1));
e) F → (rl0 , −1, F ), C → (rl0 , −1, C) and E → (rl0 , −1, E) (F , C and E propagate
reflected RL);
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f) B → (rl0 , −2, B) (B propagates reflected RL);
g) A → CLR (A detects partition);
h) B → CLR; C → CLR (propagating CLR in the isolated subnet);
i) G → CLR, F → CLR; E → CLR (propagating CLR in the isolated subnet);
Note that a UPD with a new RL has to reach all nodes in the partition. The RL is then
reflected and returned to the originator of the RL, which detects a partition. Following this
the originator of the RL creates a CLR packet which needs to be propagated throughout the
partitioned subnet. If the average per-hop processing delay is ∆, and L is the longest path
in the partitioned subnet, for a time of up to 3L∆ several nodes in the partitioned subnet
may possess non-NULL heights which are actually invalid. During this time data packets
created by nodes in the partition may be relayed back and forth till the time the nodes
realize that they do not actually have a valid height. Another disadvantage of TORA is the
need for some mechanism for time-synchronization between nodes to correctly interpret
the field τ in an RL.
Additionally, when a node sends a routing packet it is desirable to verify that 1) the
packet has reached its neighbors and 2) they have processed the packet in adherence to
the protocol. Using acknowledgments satisfies the first requirement, but does not guarantee the second. Making a node respond to every routing packet it receives, will appease
both these requirements. This will also alleviate the need for sending explicit acknowledgments, thereby potentially saving network bandwidth. More importantly, by verifying
the response, a sender can judge the legitimacy of the responder; if malicious intent is
observed such nodes can be avoided from future routes.
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TORA does not meet this requirement during its route maintenance. After losing its
last downstream link, a node reverses its upstream links (by making its height as local
maximum). An upstream neighbor that has a downstream link, even after the reversal, is
not required to respond. Now the initiator of the route maintenance cannot differentiate
this legitimate behavior from an illegitimate one, where the upstream neighbor simply
ignores the received maintenance packet.
Collisions: Perhaps the most acute of TORA’s shortcomings is its susceptibility to
collisions. Once again consider a scenario above where A reverses its link to C by sending a UPD packet. Now assume that the packet was lost due to collision. At this point
A assumes that C is its downstream neighbor, while C assumes that A is downstream,
thereby creating a simple loop. More complex loops can also result due to collision [30].
That TORA by itself was not designed to address collisions is the reason that mandates a
lower layer for this purpose. While TORA itself requires low overhead for control packets,
when considered together with the lower layer (for sending/processing acknowledgments
to/from every neighbor) TORA becomes far less appealing.

7.2

Collision Resistant TORA
Like the proactive version of TORA, CR-TORA is intended for application scenarios

where all mobile nodes require to send data packet to a single (possibly mobile) destination. Similar to proactive TORA, CR-TORA employs CLR, UPD and OPT packets. CLR
packets indicate NULL height of the sender; UPD and OPT packets indicate a non-NULL
height.
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The primary difference between CR-TORA and TORA is that CR-TORA, as the name
implies, has some in-built features to handle collisions, and thereby eliminates the need
for a lower layer like IMEP to address collisions. In doing so CR-TORA also lowers the
control packet overhead and the settling time during network partitions, and eliminates the
need for time-synchronization.
Some of the other salient differences are as follows:
i) CR-TORA does not use reference levels; the height of a node i is a single value δi
which is typically the number of hops from the destination.
ii) Two neighbors i and j at the same height (or δi = δj ) do not consider each other as
upstream/downstream based on their identities. In CR-TORA a node i is downstream of j
only if δi < δj .
Like TORA, data flows only downwards in CR-TORA.

7.2.1

CR-TORA: Principle of Operation

Recall that in TORA a node responds to link-failures or link-reversals by generating
an RL, or propagating an RL, or reflecting an RL, or clearing an RL. In CR-TORA nodes
respond by creating CLR, or propagating CLR, or creating UPD, or propagating UPD, or
retransmitting CLR.
The basic principle of operation of CR-TORA is as follows. A node losing its last
downstream link creates a CLR packet. If the receipt of a CLR packet leaves a node X
with no downstream neighbor, X propagates the CLR right away. However, if X has
other downstream neighbors it starts a timer which runs for a duration TW . While the
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timer is running X may continue to receive other control packets. If (during this time)
other control packets cause X to lose its last downstream neighbor, X propagates a CLR
right away. On the other hand, if X retains one or more downstream neighbors after the
timer expires, X creates a UPD. Neighbors of X with NULL heights then propagate the
UPD. Most often CLR packets are created when a node loses its last downstream neighbor.
However there are other scenarios (which could result due to collisions) which would also
mandate creation of a CLR packet, or retransmission of a CLR packet.
To facilitate comparison of TORA and CR-TORA we shall once again consider the
same example subnet considered for TORA in Section 7.1. At this point we shall ignore
collisions (a more detailed explanation follows in Section 7.2.2). After the OPT from the
destination φ is propagated the heights of the nodes will be (0, φ), (1, A), (2, B), (2, C),
(3, E), (3, G), and (3, F ), and subnet is depicted in Figure 7.2.1. Note that In CR-TORA
links between nodes that have same height are undirected (unlike TORA).

G

F

E

C

B

A

φ

Figure 7.2
Subnet Running CR-TORA

Assume that as earlier, the link C → A goes down. The typical sequence of events in
CR-TORA will be as follows:
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a) C → CLR (C creates CLR);
b) F → CLR; G → CLR; (F and G propagate CLR); E waits for a time TW ;
c) (No clear from B) E → UPD, δE = 3 (E creates a UPD);
d) G → UPD, δG = 4 (G propagates UPD);
e) F → UPD, δF = 5; C → UPD, δC = 5 (F and C propagate UPD).
In a scenario where A loses its link to destination φ (causing a subnet partition) the
sequence of events that transpire in in CR-TORA will be:
a) A → CLR (A creates CLR);
b) B → CLR; C → CLR (B and C propagate CLR);
c) E → CLR; F → CLR; G → CLR (E, F and G propagate CLR).
In general, TORA generates lower number of control packets compared to CR-TORA
when there is no network partition. However, this does not necessarily mean that CRTORA has a higher overhead under such scenarios as we have ignored the overhead for
IMEP in TORA. Even if IMEP overhead is ignored, TORA still generates a substantially
higher number of control packets compared to CR-TORA when partitioning occurs in the
subnet.
7.2.2

The CR-TORA Protocol

In the rest of this section we shall take a more in-depth look at the CR-TORA protocol.
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7.2.2.1

CLR Event Identifiers (CEI):

In CR-TORA a CLR is created in response to a specific event - like a broken link. We
shall see soon that there are two other specific events that lead to creation of a CLR. A
node creating a CLR assigns a unique CLR event identifier (CEI) to the event.

C

E

B

D

A
Figure 7.3
Sample Network Running CR-TORA

For example, if the link B → A goes down, B will set its height to NULL, and create
a CLR with CEI α. Node D, which on receipt of the CLR-α, has lost its only downstream
neighbor sets its height to NULL and simply propagates CLR-α. On the other hand, if the
node A goes down, two different CEIs will be created: one by B, say CLR-α, due to the
loss of the link B → A, and one by C, say CLR-β, due to the loss of the link C → A.
Unlike UPD reference heights in TORA, CR-TORA CEIs are not tied to time - or
time synchronization is not necessary in CR-TORA. The only requirement is that no two
CEIs should be the same. A simple strategy to accomplish this is choose the CEI by
concatenating the identity of the creator with a sequence number maintained by the creator.
In this case a CLR created by a node C will have a CEI C k qc . The next CLR created by
C will have a CEI C k (qc + 1). In the rest of this paper we shall simply employ a lower
case Greek letters to represent CEIs.
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7.2.2.2

CLR-List and UPD-List:

Every node maintains a CLR-list and UPD-list, both being a list of CEIs. Both lists are
emptied from time-to-time, under different circumstances. The CLR-list Ci of node i is a
list of CEIs made known to i, through CLR packets received by i. Both CLR and UPD
packets broadcast by a node i will include its CLR-list1 Ci :
i) a CLR from i is of the form [i, CLR, Ci ];
ii) a UPD from i is of the form [i, U P D, δi , Ci ].
When a node i with CLR-list Ci receives a packet [j, CLR, Cj ], it adds all CEIs in Cj
that were not already in its CLR-list Ci to its CLR-list. Thus, after the CLR is received
Ci = Ci ∪ C j .
A UPD is created by node i only after its TW -timer fires. The timer is started when i
receives a CLR, and if i still has at least one downstream neighbor. If i has at least one
downstream neighbor left even after the timer fires, i creates a UPD which includes Ci . As
soon as the UPD is sent, i i) creates a UPD-list Ui = Ci ; and ii) empties CLR-list Ci .
A node propagating a UPD merely empties its CLR-list - it does not create a UPD-list.
A node will propagate a UPD only if it had a NULL height before it received the UPD.
A node i at a NULL height receiving a UPD [j, U P D, δj , Cj ] verifies if Ci ⊂ Cj (in other
words, i checks if all CEIs known to i are “addressed” by the UPD by j). Only if Ci ⊂ Cj ,
i sets its height to δi = δj + 1, propagates UPD [i, U P D, δi , Ci ], and empties its CLR-list
Ci .
1

In our simulations the average number of CEIs that accompany a CLR or a UPD packet was found to
be less than 2; thus the size of UPD and CLR packets in both TORA and CR-TORA are comparable.
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On the other hand, if Ci 6⊂ Cj node i retransmit CLR [i, CLR, Ci ].

7.2.2.3

Other CLR Creation Scenarios:

When a node i with a non-NULL height receives a UPD [j, U P D, δj , Cj ]. Assume that
j was i’s last downstream neighbor, and the height δj announced by j is such that δj ≥ δi
(or this UPD causes i to lose its last downstream neighbor); Now i creates a CLR (with
a new CEI). Such a scenario arises when the CLR sent by j is lost due to collision, and
i creates an UPD assuming j as its downstream neighbor; which (UPD generated by i) is
then propagated by j.
When a node i with a non-NULL height receives a CLR [j, CLR, Cj ], which leads to
the loss its last downstream neighbor, i checks if any of the CEIs in Cj are also present
in i’s UPD-list Ui . If not (or Cj ∩ Ui = ∅) i propagates CLR Ci . On the other hand, if
Cj ∩ Ui 6= ∅, then i creates a new CEI. The new CEI is added to i’s CLR-list Ci before
i broadcasts CLR Ci . When a node creates a new CEI, or when it propagates a CLR, its
UPD-list is emptied.
Thus, while a UPD is created by a node i only under one condition (after the TW timer
fires, if i retains a downstream neighbor), a CLR with a new CEI is created by a node i
under three conditions:
i) i looses its last downstream link;
ii) i, which had a downstream neighbor j, receives a CLR which renders it with no
downstream neighbor, and at least one of the CEIs that accompany the CLR packet by j
is included in the UPD-list of i. Such a scenario can occur if i had prematurely created a
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UPD assuming that j is still downstream (the CLR sent by j earlier may have been delayed
or lost due to collision).
iii) When i receives a UPD packet from its last “downstream” neighbor j, node i finds
that δj ≥ δi (or i’s belief that j was downstream is recognized to be wrong).
7.2.3

The CR-TORA Algorithm

In CR-TORA the state of a node i is defined by i) latest OPT sequence number φq ; ii) its
height - δi ; iii) a neighbor-table with list of neighbors and their height (we shall represent
the height of a neighbor j as H(j)); iv) a CLR-list Ci , and v) a UPD-list Ui .
In CR-TORA every node reacts to the following five triggers: i) loss of last downstream link; ii) a CLR is received; iii) a UPD is received; iv) timer fires; and v) a OPT
is received. The rules that govern CR-TORA under each trigger is summarized by the
pseudo code as shown in Figure 7.4. In the following, DN represents “has downstream
neighbor” (and !DN represents “no downstream neighbor”). We shall use the notation δi−
to represent the height of a node i before it received a control packet. After the packet is
processed, the height of the node i may change, and is represented as δi+ .
In CR-TORA an OPT packet relayed by a node i is of the form [i, OP T, δi , φq ], where
φq is the OPT sequence number chosen by the destination. A node i receiving an OPT
from a neighbor j, [j, OP T, δj , φq ], with a fresh sequence number, node i i) sets its height
to δi = δj + 1 and retransmits the OPT; and ii) empties its CLR-list and UPD-list. As
mentioned earlier, the CLR-list is emptied when a node creates or propagates an UPD, and
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1. Node i looses last downstream link:
CREATE CLR
2. Node i receives [j, CLR, Cj ]:
IF (δi− == N U LL) return;
IF ((DN)&(timer-not-running))
start-timer;
IF (!DN)
IF (Cj ∩ Ui == ∅) PROPOGATE CLR
ELSE CREATE CLR
3. Timer fires:
IF (DN) CREATE UPD
4. i receives [j, U P D, δj , Cj ]:
IF (δi− = N U LL)
IF (Ci ⊂ Cj ) PROPOGATE UPD
ELSE RETX CLR
ELSE IF (!DN)
CREATE CLR
5: i receives OPT [j, OP T, δj , φq 0 ]:
IF (φq 0 > φq )
φq = φq 0
H(j) = δj
δi = δj + 1
flush Ci , Ui
SEND [i, OP T, δi , φq ]
IF (φq 0 = φq )
H(j) = δj

Figure 7.4
CR-TORA Algorithm
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the UPD list is emptied either when it creates or propagates a CLR. The CLR-list and the
UPD-lists of a node i are also flushed clear when a i creates a new CLR.

7.3

Formal Proof for Loop-Free Property of CR-TORA
The main idea of CR-TORA is influenced by the half-reversal technique proposed in

[75]. After the initial OPT exchange, the entire network can be seen as a directed acyclic
graph (DAG), where every node points to its downstream neighbors. Hence the entire
topology of the network can be viewed as a DAG.
Route maintenance in CR-TORA is carried out using CLR and UPD packets. When
a node X announces a CLR its height is set to N U LL, and hence has all the links that
originate or point to X can be removed from the DAG. Removing links from a DAG would
still retain its acyclic property. Additionally, X will only accepts a UPD that answers all
the CEIs included in the CLR packet sent by X. In other words X would accept a UPD
created by A, only when this UPD is generated in response to the CEIs sent by X. This
shows that the height announced by A is not dependent on that of X, as A created this
UPD after receiving the CLR from X.
If the UPD includes all the CEIs sent by X, it (node X) would accept the UPD, and
updates it height based on the height advertised by A. Now a link from X to A is added
to the DAG, and this still does not violate the acyclic property, since X previously had no
links in the DAG, and that the links that originate from A are not dependent on X. Hence
the network topology still resembles a DAG even after executing the route maintenance
phase.
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Below we present a formal proof that emphasizes the loop-freedom in CR-TORA.
Theorem 7.3.1. The network that runs CR-TORA is loop-free.
Proof based on Contradiction: Let there be a set of m nodes (N1 , N2 , · · · , Nm ) that form
a loop. Without loss of generality lets assume that the downstream neighbor of N1 is N2
(represented as downN eigh(N1 ) = N2 ), downN eigh(N2 ) = N3 , and that downN eigh(Nm ) =
N1 .
Further it can be seen that the sequence numbers stored at (N1 , N2 , · · · , Nm ) are identical, as a node would update the internally stored sequence number when it receives a
greater one.
Now since downN eigh(N1 ) = N2 , the height of N1 (represented as Height(N1 )) is
Height(N1 ) = Height(N2 ) + 1
and that of N2 is
Height(N2 ) = Height(N3 ) + 1
and hence
Height(N1 ) = Height(N3 ) + 2
Expanding this equation we get
Height(N1 ) = Height(Nm ) + (m − 1)

(7.1)

Further since downN eigh(Nm ) = N1
Height(Nm ) = Height(N1 ) + 1
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(7.2)

The equations 7.1 and 7.2, can only be satisfied when m = 0. This means that the
size of the set of nodes that form a loop in CR-TORA is 0, and hence CR-TORA is loopfree.

7.4

Simulations
Simulations were carried out to evaluate the performance of TORA and CR-TORA

using random realizations of subnet topologies with mobile nodes.
7.4.1

Simulation Environment

The simulating environment generates N = 150 randomly placed nodes in square region
with edges of size 500 meters. The range of each node was assumed to be R meters
(simulations were performed for R = 55, 60, 65). The destination is randomly chosen.
Every node periodically attempts to send a data packet to the destination - once every TD
seconds on an average (simulations were performed for TD = 1, 2, 3 seconds). However,
a node sends a data packet only if it has a non-NULL height. All simulation runs were
performed for a network time of 100 seconds.
Mobility: To model mobility, at random instances of time some nodes were moved
by random distances in X and Y directions (distance uniformly distributed between ±15
meters); some nodes were turned off; some of the nodes that are currently off were turned
on and relocated at a random position. We simulated two mobility models. In the model
M-I with lower mobility, on an average, during every second, i) Mm = 7.5% of the total
number of nodes were moved; ii) Mo = 3.75 % of the nodes were turned off; and 50 %
of nodes that are currently off are turned on. For the higher mobility model (Model M-II)
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the parameters were Mm = 15% and Mo = 7.5%. In applying the mobility model, the
only difference between the destination and the other nodes is that the destination is never
turned off.
MAC Layer: The channel bit rate was assumed to be 2Mb/s. Nodes employ p-persistent
CSMA with p ≈ 1/20. The carrier sense delay was assumed to be τcs = 1µsec sec.
In other words, two nodes within the range of each other may not sense each other’s
transmission if they begin their transmissions within τcs = 1µsec of each other2 . If a
node senses that the channel becomes available at a time t, it begins its transmission at a
time t + xτcs where x is random, and uniformly distributed between 1 and 20. A packet
is received successfully by a node (without collision) only if not more than one of the
receiver’s neighbors (the sender of the packet) was transmitting during the entire duration
of the packet. Most collisions at a node occur due to the “hidden station problem” overlapping transmissions from neighbors of a node who are not within each other’s range.
Control, Data and HELLO Packets: For both TORA and CR-TORA the destination
sends OPT packets once every Topt = 5 seconds. The duration of control packets were assumed to be 0.25 msec (about 64 bytes). The HELLO packets were 0.0625msec long
(about 16 bytes). IMEP ACK packets (only for TORA) were also assumed to be of
0.0625msec duration. For both protocols we assumed a random processing delay in each
node, uniformly distributed between 1 and 5msec.
2

1µsec is a conservative estimate given that the propagation delay for the maximum distance of 65 m is
less than 0.25µsec.

118

In TORA IMEP attempts to encapsulate multiple control/ACK packets into one IMEP
packet. To offer a collision-free environment for TORA, IMEP sends ACKs for every
control packet received. If a node has not heard an ACK from one or more of its neighbors
within a time Tack = 15 ms, it retransmits the control packet and explicitly indicates the
identities of nodes which had not acknowledged the previous transmission. Only such
nodes will need to send an ACK for the retransmitted packet. We limited the number of
retransmissions to 2.
Data packets were of duration 1 msec (about 256 bytes). The maximum duration of
IMEP packets was set at 1.0625msec (272 bytes) to permit an ACK for a data packet to be
sent along with the data packet. Only CSMA (no RTS/CTS handshake is used) was used
even for data packet transmissions due to the relatively small size of packets.
In both TORA and CR-TORA a node A with multiple downstream neighbors chooses
the one with the least height as the next hop to forward a data packet. If the data packet
transmitted by A to a neighbor B is deemed unsuccessful, then A sends the data packet
to its next downstream neighbor (if available). In both protocols a node A sending a
data packet to a neighbor B attempts to overhear the retransmission of the data packet
within a duration Tack , failing which the data packet is retransmitted. The number of
retransmissions are limited to 2 before the data transmission is deemed unsuccessful.
For maintaining dynamic list of neighbors every node tries to break silence once every
Ts seconds. If a node A has not had the need to transmit a control or data packet (or ACK
in TORA) in the last Ts seconds, A sends a HELLO packet to notify its presence to its
neighbors. If a node A has not heard a transmission from a neighbor B for more than 2Ts
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seconds, the neighbor B is removed from A’s neighbor table (if B happened to be A’s last
downstream link, link-failure route maintenance activities are triggered).
7.4.2

Results

Many simulation runs were performed; each run was for a network time of 100 seconds.
The simulations were instantiated by the destination, by sending an OPT packet. Some of
the parameters that were measured by the simulations were
a) Ntot = Nctrl + Nopt + Nack + Ndat : total number of packets: which is the sum total
numbers of control packets, OPT packets, ACK packets, and data packets.
b) Ntx : total number of transmissions; for CR-TORA Ntot = Ntx ; for TORA Ntx <
Ntot as packets queued for transmission can be aggregated by the IMEP layer.
c) ndat : number of data packets instantiated by all nodes; note that ndat << Ndat as
each of the unique ndat data packets will need multiple transmissions/retransmissions over
multiple hops.
d) nsuc : Total number of data packets reaching the destination;
e) tlat : average latency for data packets.
f) nev : Total number of last-downstream-link-loss events
Table 7.1 gives a detailed comparison of TORA and CR-TORA for one specific choice
of parameters: viz, Topt = 5, R = 60, and TD = 1 second for two mobility models M-I
and M-II.
Ideally, in the span of 100 seconds, each node should have created one data packet
- or 100N = 15000 data packets should have been created. However, as data packets
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Table 7.1
TORA (T) vs CR-TORA (CR-T) for two mobility models M-I and M-II.
M-I
M-I
M-II
M-II

T
CR-T
T
CR-T

Ntot /Ntx
ndat
nsuc Ndat
624,869/446,861 13,615 7071 312,374
231,169
13,229 8742 182,296
866,082/632,243 13,261 6232 459,083
254,318
12,917 7621 195,461

tlat
0.09
0.05
0.11
0.052

nev
198
259
397
512

are sent by a node only when they have a non-NULL height, the actual number of created data packets is less than 15,000. Ultimately the intent is to increase the number of
packets received by the destination, while lowering the cost. In the TORA subnet for
the mobility model M-I, the destination receives 7071 packets, compared to 8742 in the
CR-TORA subnet. One simple measure of the “cost” is the total number of transmissions (by all nodes together). In the TORA subnet 624,869 TORA packets are aggregated
into 446,861 IMEP transmissions compared to 231,169 packets (and the same number of
transmissions as there is no aggregating lower layer) in CR-TORA. Furthermore, the average latency in TORA is 0.09 seconds while it is only 0.05 seconds in CR-TORA. Thus,
CR-TORA outperforms TORA in every conceivable respect. CR-TORA results in a 15%
higher throughput with a 40% reduction in latency, for 40% of the cost.
Data Packets: It is interesting to note that slightly more data packets were created in
the TORA subnet (ndat = 13615) compared to ndat = 13229 for CR-TORA. The reason
for this is TORA’s long settling time during subnet partitions, during which nodes possess
a non-NULL height while they do not actually have a physical path. This is also one reason
for the substantially higher number of data packet transmissions Ndat in TORA compared
to CR-TORA (about 1.7 times higher).
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While both TORA and CR-TORA do not strive to determine the shortest path, the
average path length for TORA is 9.9 compared to 7.1 for CR-TORA. This is in part due to
the fact that a node does not consider a same height neighbor as downstream. Typically,
CR-TORA heights reflect the actual number of hops between the node and the destination.
Lower path lengths obviously lead to in lower latency. and lower data traffic. Furthermore
the substantially higher Ndat in TORA also results in more packets being queued, leading
to increased latency.
Route Maintenance Overhead: In both TORA and CR-TORA a series of route maintenance steps are triggered by an event where a node loses its last downstream neighbor.
The number of such events nev were also measured during the simulations. While both
TORA and CR-TORA were simulated for the exact same network topology (and mobility) the value nev was lower in TORA (198) compared to CR-TORA (259). As CR-TORA
does not consider a neighbor of the same height as downstream the loss of the last downstream neighbor occurs more often in CR-TORA. However, even while more maintenance
activities are triggered, CR-TORA mandates lower number of maintenance packets. Apart
from data packets, the TORA subnet invoked 624869−312374 = 312, 495 “other” packets
(HELLO, OPT, control packets like UPD and CLR, and IMEP ACK). In CR-TORA the
number of “other packets” is substantially lower at 48, 873.
Effect of Mobility: As can be seen from Table 1 CR-TORA out-performs TORA by
similar margins even for the scenario with increased mobility (M-II instead of M-I). While
increased mobility results in increased overhead and lower throughput in both TORA and
CR-TORA, the increase in TORA overhead (866082 − 624869 = 241, 213) is 10 times
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greater than that of CR-TORA (254318 − 231, 169 = 23, 149). This significant increase
in traffic also affects the latency tlat of TORA which is increased by 0.02sec (and only by
0.002sec in CR-TORA).
Waiting Time TW : One new parameter introduced by CR-TORA is the waiting time
TW . Recall that if a node receiving a CLR packet has other downstream nodes it waits
for a duration TW before it sends a UPD. We experimented with various waiting times
ranging from 10 to 20 msec. Our simulations show that a waiting time of 15 msec maximized throughput (fraction of data packets that reached the destination). However the
performance of CR-TORA is not very sensitive to this parameter. Between 10 to 20 msec
the worst and best case scenarios varied only by less than 5%.

7.4.3

Effect of Network Density

In our simulations network density is controlled by adjusting the value of the range R.
For the three of choices of R = 55, 60, 65 meters, the total number of nodes connected
to the destination (averaged over many random realizations) are 94, 128 and 141 (63%,
85%, and 94%) respectively. As can be seen from Figure 7.5(a) CR-TORA offers greater
throughput in all three cases.
Figure 7.5(b) depicts the maintenance traffic generated for different network densities.
An increase in network density (and hence connectivity) will lead to lower number of
maintenance events nev leading to lower maintenance traffic. However increased network
density can also lead to higher probability of collisions, and consequently an increase in
traffic due to retransmissions. The total number of control packets Nctrl reduced with
123

TORA
CR-TORA

16000

50%
(R = 55) (R = 60)(R = 65)

(c)

375000
250000
125000
0

(b)

32000
24000

60%

500000

Maintenance Traffic

70%

40%

Data Traffic

(a)

Latency(in sec)

Throughput

80%

8000
0

(R = 55) (R = 60)(R = 65)

(d)

0.12
0.09
0.06
0.03

(R = 55) (R = 60)(R = 65)

0

(R = 55) (R = 60)(R = 65)

Figure 7.5
Comparison of TORA and CR-TORA for different network densities

increased network density for CR-TORA; on the other hand, in TORA Nctrl increases for
high network densities due to IMEP retransmissions due to collisions.
Increased connectivity resulted in an increase in the total number of data packets created (ndat ) in both TORA and CR-TORA, and consequently led to greater data traffic
(Ndat ). As can be seen from Figure 7.5(c) the increase in Ndat with network density is
substantially higher for TORA, due to the higher number of collisions.
If we ignore collisions, one would expect lower latency with higher R due to a reduction in the number of hops. However increase in collisions with network density will
create more retransmissions and thus increase the latency. As can be seen in Figure 7.5(d),
in CR-TORA the two opposing effects almost balance out each other, causing only a very
small increase in latency with increasing network density. On the other hand, due to the
substantially higher number of collisions in TORA, the latency in TORA increases substantially with network density.
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Recall that the TORA subnet generates more “useless” data packets (which will ultimately be undeliverable) as nodes possess invalid non-NULL heights for long durations
under scenarios involving network partitions. We expect this phenomenon to be more evident for low density networks where more network partitions occur. As expected, for
R = 55, the total number of data packets originated by the TORA and CR-TORA subnet are ndat = 13282 and ndat = 11588 respectively. The total number of data packets
delivered are nsuc = 5835 for TORA and nsuc = 6612 for CR-TORA.
The facts that i) the goal of TORA is an important one for many application scenarios
and that ii) there are compelling reasons to eliminate the need for an expensive lower layer
were the motivations for the CR-TORA protocol. CR-TORA has in-built features that
address collisions, and thereby eliminates the need for IMEP. Apart from eliminating the
need for a lower layer the other beneficial properties of CR-TORA are i) lowering settling
time during network partitions (leading to less instances of “useless” data traffic); ii) lower
latency (primarily attributable to the fact that same height neighbors are not considered as
downstream) due to shorter path lengths; and iii) lack of the need for time-synchronization.
Simulations show that, compared to TORA, CR-TORA reduces the number of total number of transmissions by 60%; results in a 15% increase in throughput; and a
40% reduction in latency. CR-TORA is thus a promising protocol for many practical
MANET/sensor networks.
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CHAPTER 8
SECURING CR-TORA

In this chapter we propose to use TMMs to secure CR-TORA. CR-TORA has the same
design goals as TORA, which is to provide connectivity to a limited set of destinations.
Like TORA it provides multiple paths to each available destination. This is achieved by
storing the heights reported by each neighbor for each destination. Hence apart from its
own height, a node is also required to store the heights of its neighbors.
Further in CR-TORA, for each destination, a node has to maintain a few separate fields
like: i) the CLR and UPD lists, ii) a field to hold the waiting period, iii) current count of
available downstream neighbors.
The TMMs designed to secure CR-TORA must address the above mentioned characteristics.

8.1

IOMT Design

For securing CR-TORA a node X requires to maintain two IOMTs: i) main IOMT that
stores the height of X for each available destination, and ii) an auxiliary IOMT that stores
the heights reported by X’s neighbors for each destination.

126

8.1.1

Main IOMT

This tree is used to store the heights of a node for each available destination. Apart
from the height metric m, CR-TORA also requires a node X to store the following for
each destination:
• CLR-list
• UPD-list
• waiting period
• number of available downstream neighbors

Hence a destination record (DR) stored for a destination in CR-TORA is represented
as:
Dc = [D k d k u k T ]

(8.1)

where D = [id k q k m k a k τ ]. In the above equation:
• a and u are the cumulative hash of the current CLR and UPD lists stored for destination id respectively. The cumulative hashes are computed as explained in Section 6.1.2
• d is the number of available downstream neighbors
• T is used to hold the current waiting period

Even though X has to store additional information for each destination, a DR broadcast
for destination id should only include the current CLR-list of id. Hence while broadcasting
a packet about id it is sufficient to include the values stored in D = [id k q k m k a k τ ].
Therefore while Dc represents the stored DR, D represents the DR broadcast by a node.
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Every leaf of the main IOMT is used to store information about a unique destination,
and is of the form:
L = (id k θid k id0 )

(8.2)

where id is the identity of the destination this leaf represents, and id0 is the next available
destination. The value θid = h(Dc ) is hash of the DR stored for destination id.
In CR-TORA the height of X for a particular destination (say id) is based on the
heights reported by several neighbors of X. This deviates from protocols like AODV and
DSR, where the height of a node is based on the DR received from a single neighbor
(stored as the provider of the DR (idp )). Hence in CR-TORA, the value of θ does not
include any provider’s identity. However, X stores all the reported neighbors heights in a
separate auxiliary tree.

8.1.2

Auxiliary IOMT

This tree is used to store the reported heights of the neighbors for each destination.
Every leaf of the auxiliary tree represents a unique tuple (destination identity (say id),
neighbor identity (say idn )). The information stored for each tuple is:
d = [id k idn k m]

(8.3)

where m is the height advertised by idn .
The leaf of the auxiliary tree is of the form:
L = (i k θi k i0 )
where i = h(id k idn ), i0 is the next available tuple, and θi = h(d).
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(8.4)

8.2

TMM Data Structures
Apart from the parameters defined in Section 3.4.5, the TMM also holds two values:

i) r: root of main IOMT, and ii) ra : root of auxiliary IOMT. The value ∆W , mentioned
in Section 3.4.5, defines a constant period by which a node has to wait before creating an
UPD packet.
The self-MAC µs is bound to the root of the main IOMT r, and is valid until r is
unchanged. Additionally we introduce a new self-MAC µset which is computed as:
µset = h(x k y k z k Opt k SX )

(8.5)

where x, y and z are cumulative hashes of three different sets (say S1 , S2 , S3 respectively),
and opt is a flag that specifies the operations performed on sets S1 and S2 . The various
operations supported are: i) Union, ii) Intersection, and iii) Set Minus. A self-MAC µset
indicates that when an operation Opt is performed between the sets represented by x and
y, the result is a set represented by z.
The cumulative hash of the elements represented in the set can be found using the function extend() (as shown in Figure 6.4.5). For example let set S = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5). Now
the cumulative hash of the set S can be found by making the function call extend(c1, 4, (c2, c3, c4, c5)).
The value of the flag IN V which is used for computing the value of hr while sending
a DR, is assumes to be 0 in this chapter. Finally, the TMM has an internal function rand()
that returns unique CEIs.
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8.3

TMM Functions

Apart from the functions UpdateNeighborTable() and AddDeleteLeaf(), the proposed TMM
design exposes the following functions:
1. SetOps(),
2. SendCRT(),
3. LossOfLink(),
4. UpdateUPD() and
5. UpdateCLR()

The function SetOps() is used to carry out set operations, and is responsible for issuing
the self-MAC µset . The function SendCRT() is used to either create a DR about the node,
or send stored DRs. Stale information is removed from the tree using the function LossOfLink().

A stored DR for a destination is updated based on the received UPD/OPT and

CLR packets using the UpdateUPD() and UpdateCLR() functions respectively.

8.3.1

SetOps(n, {x1 · · · xn }, m, {y1 · · · ym }, Opt)

This function is used to execute set operations, and the algorithm followed is shown in
Figure 8.3.1. The inputs taken by this function are:
1. a set {x1 · · · xn } of size n
2. a set {y1 · · · ym } of size m
3. Opt, that mentions the operation that need to be performed on the input sets

The function performs the specified operation, and computes the cumulative hash z of
the resulting set. Finally it issues a self-MAC µset .
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SetOps(n, {x1 · · · xn }, m, {y1 · · · ym }, Opt) {
IF Opt == U N ION //Union
{z1 · · · zr } = {x1 · · · xn } ∪ {y1 · · · ym };
ELSE IF Opt == IN T
{z1 · · · zr } = {x1 · · · xn } ∩ {y1 · · · ym };
ELSE IF Opt == SET M
{z1 · · · zr } = {x1 · · · xn } \ {y1 · · · ym };
x = extend(x1 , n − 1, {x2 · · · xn });
y = extend(y1 , m − 1, {y2 · · · ym });
z = extend(z1 , r − 1, {z2 · · · zr });
RETURN µset = h(x k y k z k Opt k SX );
}

Figure 8.1
Function SetOps()

8.3.2 LossOfLink(d, Lj , vj , Dc , Li , vi )
This function is used by node X to maintain stale information, and the algorithm followed by this function can be seen in Figure 8.3.2. It takes the following inputs:
1. stored neighbor height d
2. auxiliary leaf Lj that represents d, and the set of instructions vj that map it to the
root ra
3. stored DR Dc
4. leaf Li that represents Dc , and the set of instructions vi that map it to the root r
The TMM X first maps the two leaves to their corresponding roots, and checks whether
they indeed represent the provided information.
When the stored DR is expired (τ ≤ tx ) the TMM will un-initialize the leaf Li , and
thereby erasing the information stored in the expired DR.
The TMM will un-initialize the auxiliary leaf, if the corresponding leaf for the same
destination has its θi == 0.
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Additionally the leaf Lj is also un-initialized, when the neighbor represented in d is no
longer a bidirectional neighbor. Further, if the lost neighbor was previously downstream,
the value of d is decremented. Finally, if this results in the loss of the last downstream link
(d == 0) the TMM initializes a to a newly created CEI by calling the function rand().
Lastly the leaf and the root r are updated to reflect these changes.

8.3.3 SendCRT(Dc , Li , vi )
This function is used by node X to send stored DRs, and also to create DR about X
itself. The pseudo code can be seen in Figure 8.3.3. The function takes the following
inputs:
1. stored DR Dc
2. leaf Li that represents Dc , and the set of instructions vi that map it to the root r

The TMM first checks if the function is invoked to create a DR about itself (id == X).
If so, the TMM X increments the internal sequence number, create a DR about itself, and
finally authenticate it to all the bidirectional neighbors of X.
However if the function is invoked to relay stored DRs, the TMM first maps the leaf to
the root r, and later verifies if the leaf holds information about Dc . If the stored DR has
an infinite height the TMM authenticates it to all the bidirectional neighbors right away.
Nevertheless, if m < IN F the TMM only sends the DR if the corresponding waiting
period has expired (T ≤ tx ). For this case, the TMM copies the value of u into a (copies
the UPD-list into CLR-list). Finally TMM X updates the leaf and the root r subsequently.
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LossOfLink(d, Lj , vj , Dc , Li , vi ) {

//Dc = [id k q k τ k m k a k IN V k n k u k T ];
//Li = [i k θi k i0 ];
//d = [ido k idpo k mo ];
//Lj = [j k θj k j 0 ];
IF (r 6= mapleaf (Li , vi )) ∨ (ra 6= mapleaf (Lj , vj )) RETURN ERROR;
IF ((θi 6= h(Dc ) ∨ (θj 6= h(d))) RETURN ERROR;
IF (id 6= ido ) RETURN ERROR;
//house keeping without external input
IF (τ ≤ tx ) //prepare main leaf for removal
Li = (i k 0 k i0 ); r = mapleaf (Li , vi );
RETURN;
IF (θi == 0) //prepare aux leaf for removal
Lj = (j k 0 k j 0 ); ra = mapleaf (Lj , vj );
RETURN;
//update without external input
IF (checkbd(idpo ) == 0) // only possible reason is loss of link to idpo
θj = 0; ra = mapleaf (Lj , vj );
IF (mo < m)
d = d − 1;
IF (d < 1)
m = IN F ;
T = 0; u = 0;
a = rand(); create new CEI
θi = h(Dc ); r = mapleaf (Li , vi );
}
Figure 8.2
Function LossOfLink()
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SendCRT(Dc , Li , vi ) {
//Dc = [id k q k τ k m k a k IN V k n k u k T ];
//Li = [i k θi k i0 ];
IF (r 6= mapleaf (Li , vi )) ∨ (id 6= i) ∨ (h(Dc ) 6= θi )) RETURN ERROR;
hr = h(h(id k q k τ k m k a) k 0);
IF (T < tx )
RETURN computemacs(hr , X, 0);
IF (a 6= 0)
u = a; a = 0;
θi = h(Dc ); r = mapleaf (Li , vi );
}

Figure 8.3
Function SendCRT()

8.3.4

Macro INPUT-VALIDATE

For the sake of simplicity we divided the function that updates stored DRs into UpdateUPD() and UpdateCLR().

Function UpdateUPD() is invoked when a UPD packet is received,

while UpdateCLR() is called when a CLR packet is received. However the inputs accepted,
and the initial input validations performed by these two functions are identical. Hence we
defined a macro INPUT-VALIDATEthat performs these identical operations, and it is loaded
in both the function UpdateUPD() and UpdateCLR(). The operations carried out by INPUTVALIDATEcan

be seen in Figure 8.3.4.

The inputs accepted by both the function UpdateUPD() and UpdateCLR() are:
1. the received DR Dw , and its provider idpw
2. self-MAC µs
3. stored neighbor height d
4. auxiliary leaf Lj that represents d, and the set of instructions vj that map it to the
root ra
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5. stored DR Dc
6. leaf Li that represents Dc , and the set of instructions vi that map it to the root r
7. S = [x k y k z k Opt k µset ]

The TMM first validates the self-MACs µset and µs . Later the TMM maps the two
leaves to their corresponding roots, and also verifies if they indeed point to the information
provided.
Further, if either of θi or θj are set to 0 the TMM initializes them to their default values.
Finally before updating the received height of the neighbor, the TMM stores the currently
stored height into a temporary variable. This is done to enable further checks on the status
(either upstream or downstream) of the neighbor, before receiving the DR Dw .

8.3.5 UpdateUPD(Dw , idpw , µs , d, Lj , vj , Dc , Li , vi , S)
This function is invoked by node X to update stored DRs when a DR with finite height
(mw < IN F ) is received. The pseudo code followed by the function can be seen in
Figure 8.3.5.
TMM X first loads the macro INPUT-VALIDATEto perform input validations. Later the
TMM performs two checks. First, the TMM checks if both the received (mw ) and stored
(m) heights are finite. If so, the TMM increments d if mw < m, and if the sender was
previously not counted as downstream. Additionally, if mw ≥ m and the provider was
previously counted as downstream the value of d is decremented. Now if the updates d
is equal to 0, it means that X lost its last downstream link due to link reversal. Hence X
would clear its stored height, and create a new CEI as mentioned in Section 7.2.2.3.
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INPUT-VALIDATE(Dw , idpw , µs , d, Lj , vj , Dc , Li , vi , S) {
//Dw = [idw k qw k mw k aw k τw ];
//d = [ido k idpo k mo ];
//Dc = [id k q k m k a k τ k d k u k T ];
//Lj = [j k θj k j 0 ];
//Li = [i k θi k i0 ];
//S = [x k y k z k Opt k µset ]
//verify all inputs
IF ((µset 6= 0) ∧ (µset 6= h(x k y k z k Opt k SX )) RETURN ERROR;
IF (µs 6= (h(h(Dw ) k 0) k idpw k r k SX )) RETURN ERROR;
IF (r 6= mapleaf (Li , vi )) ∨ (ra 6= mapleaf (Lj , vj )) RETURN ERROR;
IF ((θi 6= h(Dc ) ∨ (θj 6= h(d))) RETURN ERROR;
IF (((idw 6= id) ∧ (idpw 6= idpo )) ∨ (id 6= ido ) ∨ (id 6= i) ∨ (qw < q)) RETURN ERROR;
IF (θj == 0)
ido = idw ; idpo = idpw ; mo = IN F ]
IF (θi == 0)
id = idw ; q = 0; τ = 0; m = IN F ; a = 0; IN V = 0; d = 0; u = 0; T = 0;
0
mo = mo ; mo = mw ;
IF (qw > q)
q = qw ; a = 0; τ = τw ; u = 0; T = 0; m = IN F ; d = 0;
}

Figure 8.4
Macro INPUT-VALIDATE
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The second check performed by the TMM is to verify if X received a finite height when
the stored height for the destination is infinite. According to CR-TORA, X only accepts
this UPD if all the CEIs stored in its CLR-list are included in the received packet. In other
words, performing set minus between the stored and received CEIs should return NULL.
The TMM uses the values included in the self-MAC µset to evaluate this condition. If
satisfied, the received height is accepted by the TMM, else the stored height is unchanged.
Finally the TMM X updates the leaf and root subsequently.
UpdateUPD(Dw , idpw , µs , d, Lj , vj , Dc , Li , vi , S) {
INPUT-VALIDATE//load the macro

IF ((mw < IN F ) ∧ (m < IN F )) //UPD
IF ((mw < m) ∧ (m0o > m − 1))
d = d + 1;
ELSE IF ((mw ≥ m) ∧ (m0o < m))
d = d − 1;
IF (d < 1) //last DN lost due to link reversal
a = rand(); u = 0; T = 0; m = IN F ; d = 0; mo = IN F ; //create new clear
ELSE IF ((mw < IN F ) ∧ (m == IN F )) //UPD
IF ((a == 0) ∨ ((µset ) ∧ (Opt = SET M ) ∧ (x == a) ∧ (y == aw ) ∧ (z == 0)))
//accept UPD as all CEIs addressed
m = mw + 1; d = 1;
ELSE
mo = IN F ; T = 0;
θj = h(d); ra = mapleaf (Lj , vj );
θi = h(Dc ); r = mapleaf (Li , vi );
}
Figure 8.5
Function UpdateUPD()
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8.3.6 UpdateCLR(Dw , idpw , µs , d, Lj , vj , Dc , Li , vi , S)
This function is used by node X to update the stored DRs based on received CLR
packets (mw == IN F ). The algorithm followed can be seen in Figure 8.3.6.
Like UpdateUPD() the function first loads INPUT-VALIDATEto perform input validations.
The function only executes when the stored height (m) is finite. When both the stored
and received heights are infinite, its usually the case when a node is hearing back the CLR
it sent, and no action is needed.
Hence when m < IN F , the TMM first checks if the provider of the CLR was previously listed as downstream. If yes the value of d is decremented. Now if the updated
d > 0, node X has a valid height even after processing the CLR. Hence the TMM sets the
waiting time T (if its not already set), and adds the received CEIs to its existing CLR-list.
The TMM uses the values included in S to carry out this operation.
However if d becomes 0, the TMM has lost its last downstream link, and would clear
the stored height. Now the TMM first checks if the received CEIs intersect with the stored
UPD-list. In such a case the TMM would create a new CEI as explained in Section 7.2.2.3.
If not the TMM adds the received CEIs to its existing CLR-list.

8.4

Realizing CR-TORA
In this section we explain how the above mentioned functions can be used to realize

CR-TORA protocol. Firstly the function UpdateNeighborTable() can be used to maintain
connectivity and to create self-MAC µs . The function SendTS() is used to create periodic
HELLO packets. The function AddDeleteLeaf() can be used to create place holders when
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UpdateCLR(Dw , idpw , µs , d, Lj , vj , Dc , Li , vi , S) {
INPUT-VALIDATE// loading the macro

IF ((mw == IN F ) ∧ (m < IN F )) //CLR
IF ((m0o < m) ∧ (d > 1))
d = d − 1;
IF (T ≤ tx ) //timer has not been set
T = tx + ∆W ; //start timer
IF ((µset == 0) ∧ (a == 0)) a = aw ;
ELSE IF ((µset ) ∧ (Opt = U N ION ) ∧ (x == a) ∧ (y == aw )) a = z;
ELSE RETURN ERROR;
ELSE IF ((m0o < m) ∧ (d == 1)) //last DN will be lost
mo = 0; T = 0; //ready to send CLR
IF (u 6= 0)
IF ((µset == 0) ∨ (Opt 6= IN T ) ∨ (x 6= u) ∨ (y 6= aw )) RETURN ERROR;
IF (z 6= 0)
a = rand(); u = 0; T = 0 //create new CEI
ELSE IF (z == 0)
a = aw ; u = 0; T = 0 //copy received CEI
ELSE IF ((µset == 0) ∧ (a == 0))
a = aw ;
ELSE IF (µset ∧ (Opt = U N ION ) ∧ (x == a) ∧ (y == aw ))
a = z;
ELSE RETURN ERROR;
θj = h(d); ra = mapleaf (Lj , vj );
θi = h(Dc ); r = mapleaf (Li , vi );
}
Figure 8.6
Function UpdateCLR()
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information about new identities arrive. For example when node X receives a DR about
destination D from a neighbor A for the first time, it invokes AddDeleteLeaf() to create an
uninitiated leaf in the main tree for identity D. Additionally, X calls AddDeleteLeaf() one
more time to create an uninitiated leaf for h(D k A) in the auxiliary tree. These uninitiated
leafs are later submitted to either UpdateUPD() or UpdateCLR() for further processing.
When destination D desires to create an OPT packet, it calls the function SendCRT()
which returns a DR about D that includes its latest sequence number. Every node on
receiving the OPT packet submits the received and saved DR for D to the function UpdateUPD().

Further maintenance of stale information is carried out by invoking the function LossOfLink().

Say X looses its connectivity to a neighbor A, through which it received a DR

for D. Now X invokes its LossOfLink() to un-initialize the auxiliary leaf for h(D k A).
Further the function also updates the downstream count d to reflect this loss. If d is updated to 0, the function LossOfLink() clears the heights stored for D. The updated DR can
later be submitted to SendCRT(), which authenticates it to all the bidirectional neighbors
of X.
The functions UpdateUPD() and UpdateCLR() are used to update stored DRs based on
the received packets. Changes caused due to OPT and UPD packets are handled by invoking UpdateUPD(), while those introduced by received CLR packets are made by calling
UpdateCLR().

The function SetOps() is used to perform the various set operations required for CRTORA. As explained earlier the UPD-list and CLR-list are represented by their cumulative
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hashes in the stored DR. For example consider that a node X receives a CLR that wipes
out its last downstream link for destination D. Now according to CR-TORA protocol, X
would clear its stored height for D, and have to update its stored CLR-list.
For instance, if any of the CEIs included in X’s UPD-list are listed in the received
CLR packet, X has to create a new CEI. In order to achieve this functionality node X
makes the call SetOps(n, {x1 · · · xn }, m, {y1 · · · ym }, IN T ), where {x1 · · · xn } represents
the stored UPD-list and {y1 · · · yn } represents the received CEIs. The function would
return a self-MAC µset that specifies the result of performing an intersection on the inputs
sets. Now along with the received and stored DRs for D, X also submits this self-MAC
µset to the function UpdateCLR(). In this fashion the function SetOps() can be used to carry
out required set operations.
Finally the function SendCRT() can be used by a node X to relay stored DRs. If the
DR has infinite height the function relays it immediately. However, the condition T ≤ tx
must be satisfied while relaying DRs with finite heights. This ensures that a particular DR
cannot be sent until the expiry of its waiting period.

8.5

Security Offered by the TMMs
In this section we analyze how the proposed approach secures CR-TORA. The TMMs

designed in this chapter are an extension to the basic TCB presented in Chapter 4. Hence
the assurances offered by the basic TCB can also be extended to the TMMs used to secure
CR-TORA. These TMMs use IOMTs to store acquired routing information to thwart the
attacks listed in Section 4.3.3.
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8.5.1

Assertion Statements

Lemma 1. A node X can not illegally modify information stored in an IOMT.
Proof. The designed TMMs have two IOMTs: i) main IOMT to store the height of X for
each available destination, and ii) an auxiliary IOMT to store the heights of each neighbor
for every destination. The roots of both the trees (r and ra ) are securely stored within
the TMM. According to the property of a merkle tree, the root binds all the values that are
stored in its leaves. Hence it is impossible for the node to change the information currently
binded by the roots r and ra .

8.5.2

Assurances Offered by the TMMs

Theorem 6.6.1. A node X can not hide available downstream links for a destination D.
Proof. As shown in Section 8.1.1 the destination record (DR) stored for D is of the form:
Dc = [D k d k u k T ]

(8.6)

where d is the number of available downstream links. Whenever X submits a received
routing packet (either to the function UpdateUPD() or UpdateCLR()) for further processing,
the value of d is updated based on the newly arrived data. Additionally the value of d
is also updated by LossOfLink(), whenever X looses a neighbor. Therefore at any given
instant the value d represents the number of downstream neighbors available for D.
Further, Lemma 1 states that node X can not introduce illegal modifications to the
information stored in an IOMT. Hence X can not hide available downstream links to a
destination D.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This chapter summarizes the contributions of this dissertation to secure MANET routing protocols, and outlines some possible extensions to this research.
The primary motivation for the research was that proactive security approaches - which
attempt to ensure that nodes will not be able to misbehave - have many compelling advantages over reactive approaches which attempt to detect and react to inconsistencies. The
specific advantages of proactive (as opposed to reactive) approaches are as follows:
Overhead: Proactive approaches mandate lower bandwidth overhead as the overhead
for carrying over authentication is eliminated.
Efficiency: Improved efficiency results both from reduction in bandwidth overhead
and the enhanced scope of assurances provided. Proactive approaches can be as efficient
as the original protocols which simply assume that nodes will not misbehave. Reactive secure extensions to such protocols had to deliberately turn-off many efficiency-enhancing
features of such protocols due to the fact that providing assurances for such complex features will mandate very high overhead to make them useful.
Universality: Reactive approaches are intricately tied to the exact nature of the protocol. Proactive approaches with higher level goals are not. It is for this reason that the
approach proposed in this dissertation mandates very little changes to the original pro143

tocols. For all protocols the packet output by a node conforms to the original protocol
specification. The only difference is that each packet is accompanied by one or more
message authentication codes and a time stamp.

9.1

Contributions
While some researchers have investigated strategies to realize secure routing protocols

through trustworthy computing, such approaches have been superficial. Such approaches
make unjustifiable assumptions regarding the components of node that are trusted. At
the very essence of trustworthy computing is the compelling need to reduce the trusted
computing base to the extent feasible. Only a well trusted TCB can be meaningfully
amplified to realize the desired assurances.
This dissertation makes several contributions in the area of securing MANETs using
trustworthy computing. We provide a detailed description of trusted MANET modules
(TMM), their functionality, and the interfaces exposed to access such functionality. In
the approach based on TMMs, TMMs create routing data, send authenticated routing data
to TMMs of neighboring nodes, receive authenticated data from TMMs of neighboring
nodes. From the perspective of two TMMs the nodes that house them are untrusted middlemen who facilitate exchanges between the TMMs and store routing information.
One contribution of this dissertation was the trivial AtomicRelay() function to provide
several assurances not provided by current secure routing protocols. The AtomicRelay()
function simply needs to accept routing data from neighbors and relay them to neighbors
while enforcing some simple rules (for example, incrementing the hop-count field by one).
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Simply accepting and relaying data poses no significant challenge even for severely
resource limited modules. The main challenge stems from the need to store routing data,
as relayed routing information may be a function of several pieces of routing data received
in the past.
Perhaps the most important contribution of this dissertation is the index ordered merkle
tree (IOMT), which makes it possible for a TMM to virtually store the routing data. More
specifically, while it is believed that a merkle tree is sufficient to virtually store dynamic
data, we demonstrated that using a merkle tree opens up replay attacks due to the inability
to confirm negative queries. This necessary ability is provided by using an IOMT instead
of a merkle tree.
With the ability to store routing data using IOMTs our research proceeded to identify
specific functionality required of TMMs to secure various routing protocols like AODV,
DSR and CR-TORA.
As mentioned in our hypothesis, the tasks performed within the proposed TMMs are
deliberately restricted to cryptographic hash functions and logical operations. Moreover,
when TMMs are utilized to provide secure routing, only few MACs need to be appended
to existing routing packets. Hence, the overhead required for realizing the proposed TCB
is considerably reduced.
Another important contribution of this dissertation is a novel protocol - collision resistant TORA, developed to address several weaknesses of TORA. In particular, TORA
is susceptible to collisions, has complex rules for maintaining the height of a node (for
which reason no secure extension of TORA has been proposed in the literature to carry
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over authentication in TORA), and demands high overhead when network partitions occur.
CR-TORA was designed to simultaneously address all of TORA’s weaknesses.

9.2

Scope for Future Work
Two avenues of future work include

1. investigating possible improvements to the TMM interfaces and functionality,
2. investigating the utility of IOMT in other application settings

In regard to the first avenue, one important addition can be identifying TMM functionality required for link-state based protocols. Note that all protocols that have been addressed by this dissertation are based on distance vector routing. Another possibility is to
make necessary modifications to the interfaces and TMM functionality to enable the next
specification of trusted platform modules (TPM) to support additional functionality. Currently, an extension of TPM specification is underway which focuses on mobile platforms
[76, 77]. However, thus far the additional features in mobile TPMs are restricted to those
features/restrictions demanded by mobile phone network operators and content distributors. The developed TMM functionality could be a useful addition to TPMs in mobile
devices as many mobile devices of the future are expected to take part in ad hoc routing.
One of the primary differences between IOMT and a merkle tree is that in the merkle
tree each leaf is independent. In an IOMT we deliberately introduce inter-dependencies
between leaves to permit querying. More specifically, by ordering by a unique index we
can facilitate negative queries. However many other types of inter-dependencies may be
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imposed for performing different types of queries. Some of the ongoing work investigating
such extensions of IOMT include [78] and [79].

9.3

Publications
The following publications resulted from the research performed towards the disserta-

tion:
1. V. Thotakura, M. Ramkumar, Collision Resistant Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm, International Journal of Information Sciences and Computer Engineering,
pp 1-8, Vol 1, No 1, 2010.
2. V. Thotakura, M. Ramkumar, “Leveraging a Minimal Trusted Computing Base for
Securing On-Demand MANET Routing Protocols”, Proceedings: 9th International
Information and Telecommunication Technologies Symposium (I2TS’2010), Brazil,
Dec 2010.
3. V. Thotakura, M. Ramkumar, “Minimal TCB for MANET Nodes”, Proceedings: 6th
IEEE International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and
Communications, Niagara Falls, Oct 2010.
4. V. Thotakura, M. Ramkumar, Securing AODV and DSR Using Trustworthy Computing, Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (TDSC)
5. V. Thotakura, M. Ramkumar, Design of a Trusted Module for Securing CR-TORA,
Submitted to the IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security (TIFS).
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